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ABSTRACT 
 
This master thesis explores the relationship between child soldier recruitment and rebel groups’ 
perpetration of sexual violence. As research has shown that levels of sexual violence not only vary 
across conflicts, but also across armed groups, scholars have recently come to examine what armed 
group characteristics can explain this variation. Even though the literature has emphasized rebel 
groups’ recruitment practices as important factors, no study has yet considered the impact of child 
soldier recruitment on rebel groups’ perpetration of sexual violence. This thesis aims to fill this 
research gap by examining how the recruitment of child soldiers may influence rebel-perpetrated 
sexual violence. I develop a theoretical framework that presents four different, yet interrelated, 
arguments as to why rebel groups that recruit child soldiers are more likely to engage in higher 
levels of sexual violence. To test the hypothesized relationship empirically, I analyze rebel groups 
active in armed conflicts between 1989-2009, using a newly compiled dataset on child soldier 
recruitment combined with group-level data on conflict-related sexual violence. The results show 
that child soldiering is strongly associated with higher levels of sexual violence by rebel groups. 
Thus, my findings have important implications for both scholars and policymakers.   
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1. Introduction 
 
“We were forced to kill without fear, raping girls and women, to prove that we were very strong” 
– Ibrahim, former child soldier in Chad (UNICEF 2014). 
 
Why do some armed groups engage in widespread sexual violence whereas others do not? This is 
a question that has gained attention in the academic literature, as recent studies have shown that 
the levels and types of sexual violence not only vary across conflicts, but also across armed groups 
(Cohen 2013; Leiby 2009; Wood 2009). As a result, many scholars have begun to examine what 
armed group characteristics and factors can explain this observed variation (Wood 2009, 2014). At 
large, sexual violence in armed conflicts still remains a poorly understood and understudied topic, 
despite the international community’s recognition of conflict-related sexual violence as a grave 
threat to international peace and security, and the increased attention that the issue has gained in 
media reporting. Both researchers and policymakers within the United Nations (UN) have asked 
for more systematic analyses of conflict-related sexual violence so that future policies can be 
evidence-based (e.g., UN Security Council 2010). One of the most influential studies within this 
nascent field of research highlights that recruitment practices, i.e. who is recruited and how, is an 
important factor for understanding the variation in sexual violence across armed actors (Cohen 
2013). However, no study has yet considered the impact of child soldier recruitment on armed 
groups’ perpetration of sexual violence. This thesis aims to fill this research gap by examining both 
theoretically and empirically how the recruitment of child soldiers may influence the levels of sexual 
violence perpetrated by rebel groups. Thus, the thesis seeks to answer the following research 
question. Do rebel groups that recruit child soldiers perpetrate more sexual violence?  
 
Even though child soldier recruitment is one of the gravest violations of children’s rights, it has 
during the last decades become an increasingly common practice amongst rebel groups around the 
world. Like conflict-related sexual violence, little is known about child soldiers’ roles as members 
of armed groups. Therefore, it is important to gain a better understanding of child soldiers’ 
experiences during war. Whereas it is commonly known that many children are abused as sex slaves 
by high-ranking commanders, less attention has been given to the fact that child soldiers also are 
forced to perpetrate and participate in acts of sexual violence against others, as illustrated by the 
above quote from a former child soldier in Chad. Even though there are no studies that 
systematically examine the relationship between child soldier recruitment and the levels of sexual 
violence perpetrated by rebel groups, insights from the child soldier literature gives us reasons to 
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believe that there is a direct link between the two.  
 
In this thesis, I develop a theoretical framework that presents four different, yet interrelated, 
arguments as to why rebel groups that recruit child soldiers are more likely to perpetrate higher 
levels of sexual violence. First, I argue that rebel groups force children to participate in acts of 
sexual violence as part of their indoctrination and initiation process. Second, because children have 
not developed the same psychological characteristics and cognitive functions as adults, it is easier 
for rebel groups to manipulate children and force them into committing violent acts. Thus, it may 
be easier for a rebel commander to order sexual violence if a group consists of many child soldiers. 
Third, these psychological characteristics also make it more likely that child soldiers will participate 
in sexual violence due to peer pressure, even when not directly ordered. Finally, even if the children 
themselves are not actively taking part in acts of sexual violence, their presence can enable other 
older combatants to more easily engage in such violence. To test the hypothesized relationship 
empirically, I analyze rebel groups active in armed conflicts between 1989-2009, using a newly 
compiled dataset on child soldier recruitment combined with group-level data on conflict-related 
sexual violence. The results show that rebel groups that recruit child soldiers indeed engage in more 
sexual violence.  
 
The thesis unfolds as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the previous research on the 
causes of conflict-related sexual violence and identifies a research gap within the existing literature. 
In chapter 3, I develop four theoretical arguments as to why child soldier recruitment is associated 
with higher levels of rebel-perpetrated sexual violence. Based on these arguments I proceed by 
deriving a hypothesis. Chapter 4 introduces the data used in my empirical analysis and describes 
the operationalization of the variables included, as well as the method employed to estimate the 
results. Thereafter, I present the findings from my empirical analysis and conduct a series of 
robustness tests to ensure that the findings remain consistent across model specifications. In 
chapter 6, I provide a more extensive discussion about the results, as well as the limitations of my 
study. The last chapter summarizes the thesis and concludes with a discussion regarding the 
theoretical and policy implications of the findings. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
6 
2. Previous Research  
The following chapter begins with a brief background and definition of the term conflict-related 
sexual violence, followed by a more extensive overview of the existing literature examining the 
causes and variation in conflict-related sexual violence. First, classical country- and conflict-level 
explanations are presented, before turning to group-level explanations.  
 
2.1 Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: A Brief Background 
Even though the history of sexual violence during wartime is as long as the history of war itself, 
research on conflict-related sexual violence is a relatively recent phenomenon (Eriksson Baaz and 
Stern 2013; Koos 2015; UN Women 1998). The literature examining the human costs of armed 
conflicts and civil wars has mainly come to focus on lethal violence such as battle deaths or civilian 
killings (Cohen 2013). Since for long sexual violence was viewed as an inevitable by-product of 
war, this is not surprising. It was not until after the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
where rape was widespread, that the issue gained increased attention by the media, policymakers 
and scholars. Because of the large emphasis on a few specific cases where sexual violence was 
massive, sexual violence in conflict settings came to be understood as a strategic weapon of war. 
This dominant narrative led to a neglect of cases where sexual violence follows other patterns. 
However, in the last couple of years an increasing number of scholars have noted that the 
magnitude of sexual violence in fact varies across conflicts and countries (e.g., Wood 2009). Several 
authors have sought to explain this variation and identify factors that contribute to making conflict-
related sexual violence prevalent. However, before delving further into some of the most 
prominent arguments and findings within the field, it is useful to clarify what scholars and 
policymakers mean by the term conflict-related sexual violence. 
 
The most common understanding of the concept conflict-related sexual violence amongst both 
scholars and the international community mirrors the definitions provided by The International 
Criminal Court (ICC) (Wood 2009). The ICC definition includes acts of, but is not restricted to: 
“rape, sexual torture and mutilation, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, enforced sterilization, 
and forced pregnancy” (ICC 2000). Comparably, the UN defines the term in the following way:  
 
“The term “conflict-related sexual violence” refers to rape, sexual slavery, forced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilization, forced marriage 
and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, 
men, girls or boys that is directly or indirectly linked (temporally, geographically or 
causally) to a conflict” (UN Security Council 2016:1). 
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Both the ICC and the UN consider sexual violence a broad category that allows for the inclusion 
of other acts than those explicitly listed. The concept recognizes that not only women and girls, 
but also men and boys, can become victims of sexual violence.  
 
2.2 Classical Country- and Conflict-Level Explanations  
Opportunism  
Most of the existing studies that try to explain the causes of conflict-related sexual violence offer 
explanations at the level of the country or the conflict. One such common explanation is that war 
provides an increased opportunity for individuals to carry out acts of sexual violence. With war 
comes a breakdown of social norms, an absence of the rule of law and weakened state institutions. 
Since punishment appears unlikely in these lawless environments, many soldiers might take 
advantage of the situation (Muvumba Sellström 2015; Butler et al. 2007; Brownmiller 1975; 
Goldstein 2001). From this point of view, men are primarily driven by their sexual urges, urges that 
are unleashed in a context of war and result in acts of sexual abuse or rape (Haer et al. 2015:613). 
However, the opportunity-argument is problematic since it relies on an assumption that all men 
have a latent desire to rape. Cohen (2013) finds partial evidence that state collapse is associated 
with higher levels of insurgent-perpetrated rape, but in general there is weak cross-national 
evidence in support of the opportunity-hypothesis (Cohen and Nordås 2015; Loken 2017; Green 
2015). Scholars seem to agree that state collapse and weakened institutions are necessary conditions 
that make sexual violence more likely to occur in wartime than in peacetime, but that this alone 
does not provide a sufficient explanation (Wood 2009). 
 
An additional set of arguments related to opportunism emphasize the role of greed. Weinstein 
(2005) argue that armed groups are more prone to engage in rape when conflicts are driven by 
“economic endowments”, particularly endowments or resources that can easily be transformed 
into selective incentives used to attract new members. When insurgent groups have access to 
lootable resources, such as natural resource revenues, they might both attract more violent 
members, and be in less need of civilian support (Cohen 2013; Weinstein 2007). 
 
Ethnic hatred 
Another widely held belief amongst scholars is that ethnic conflicts are associated with higher levels 
of sexual violence (e.g., Benard 1994; Bloom 1999; Horowitz 1985; Mullins 2009; Sharlach 2000; 
Plümper and Neumayer 2006). Ethnic hatred and religious cleavages is said to give rise to more 
intense emotions, and these types of conflicts are therefore thought to provide a breeding ground 
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for more extreme types of violence (Fearon 2006:682; Koos 2015). Authors in favor of this 
argument claim that sexual violence can be used to humiliate opponents and to demonstrate 
dominance over a different ethnic or religious group. Acts of sexual violence are not only intended 
to humiliate the targeted women, but also other members belonging to the same ethnic group, as 
it is implied that these members failed to protect the victims (Plümper and Neumayer 2006:735). 
Mullins (2009:15) argues that ethnically-charged conflicts are more likely to feature sexual violence 
as a central technique. Rape can be perpetrated in order to kill members of other ethnic groups, 
for example through the spread of HIV/AIDS. The objective can also be to inflict long-term 
physical and psychological trauma on the victim and the victim’s relatives (Cohen 2016:51). 
Furthermore, rape is sometimes perpetrated with the specific intent to impregnate women of the 
opponent group, as in the Bosnian conflict where Serbian troops abducted and raped Muslims and 
Catholic Croats in order to “create” Serbian children (Slazman 1998). Even though ethnic hatred 
appears to be a well-established explanation for the occurrence of conflict-related sexual violence, 
there is little cross-national evidence supporting the argument as most large-N studies do not find 
a significant relationship between ethnic conflicts and higher levels of sexual violence (e.g., Butler 
et al. 2007; Cohen 2013). Leiby (2009) argues that the academic literature’s preoccupation with the 
atrocities committed in a few extreme conflicts, mainly Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, where 
the intersection of ethnic violence and widespread rape was apparent, has created a narrative in 
which ethnic hatred has been given too much explanatory power.  
 
Gender inequality 
Besides the arguments on behalf of opportunism and ethnic hatred, it is also generally assumed 
that levels of gender inequality play an important role in explaining sexual violence in conflicts 
(Cohen 2016; Koo 2002; Jefferson 2004). Gender inequality can create and facilitate social norms 
that spur violence against women, including CRSV (Baron and Straus 1989; MacKinnon 2006). 
The argument predicts that countries with low levels of gender equality in peacetime will experience 
more sexual violence in wartime. Some authors claim that sexual violence during conflict is a 
continuation and worsening of the discriminatory practices and gender-based violence that women 
experience every day in peacetime (Jefferson 2004; Farr 2009). According to these authors, the 
onset of armed conflict exacerbates already existing gender inequalities, making women even more 
vulnerable targets. On a related note, Butler and Jones’ (2016) findings suggest that a country’s pre-
conflict level of sexual violence is predictive of the level of sexual violence the country will 
experience during conflict. However, their preliminary results show that levels of sexual violence 
before and during conflict do not differ significantly, in contrast to the popular belief. Moreover, 
  
 
9 
Wood (2009) points out that the continuum thesis does not explain why for example gang rape 
and sexual abuse by multiple perpetrators is much more prevalent during conflict than during 
peace. 
 
Many authors favoring the gender inequality thesis emphasize that militarized masculinity plays an 
important role in explaining the occurrence of conflict-related sexual violence (e.g., Morris 1996; 
Wood 2014). Training practices within state militaries often rely on gendered stereotypes when it 
comes to building group cohesion and changing combatants’ individual identities (Wood 2009). 
The ideals of masculinity associated with war and military practice create a sharp dichotomy where 
women are seen as victims and “objects” of protection, whereas men are viewed as fighters and 
protectors (Koo 2002). Thus, in a situation of war, a distinction between “our” women and “their” 
women is established. Soldiers might therefore try to dominate their opponent in gendered terms, 
something that might provide an explanation for sexual violence against the enemy population. As 
with the opportunism and ethnic hatred thesis, there is scant empirical evidence indicating that 
gender inequality is associated with higher levels of sexual violence in wartime. Most quantitative 
studies find no apparent relationship between society-level indicators of gender equality and levels 
of CRSV (e.g., Cohen 2013; Loken 2017). Wood (2009) claims that widespread gender inequality 
might be a necessary condition for sexual violence to be prevalent during conflict, but that this is 
not enough to account for the observed variation between intrastate armed conflicts.  
 
2.3 Group-Level Explanations  
One of the most important findings in the recent literature is that levels of perpetrated sexual 
violence not only vary across conflict and countries, but also across armed groups. Scholars have 
noted that not all armed actors engage in widespread sexual violence, some groups even appear to 
completely refrain from committing sexual atrocities (Leiby 2009; Wood 2009). Within and across 
conflicts there is a particularly wide variation when it comes to rebel groups’ use of sexual violence 
(Sawyer et al. 2016:3). Thus, recent studies increasingly focus on the different characteristics of 
armed groups and many argue that group-level factors are essential in order to explain the observed 
variation sexual violence (Wood 2009, 2014). 
   
Internal culture, structure and aim 
When it comes to explaining why some groups refrain from engaging in sexual violence, some 
authors tend to focus on internal cultures and ideologies (e.g., Sawyer et al. 2016; Hoover Green 
2016; Leiby 2009). For example, during the Salvadoran civil war the rebel group FMLN displayed 
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a general restrain against sexual violence, something that is largely attributed to the norms produced 
by their ideological foundation (Sawyer et al. 2016; Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2013). Moreover, 
Hoover Green (2016:619) claims that rebel groups that develop strong and consistent institutions 
for political education are more likely to have narrower repertories of violence, and therefore also 
engage in lower levels of sexual violence than those without such institutions. Another group of 
authors consider the internal structure of an armed group as a more important factor. These 
scholars tend to favor a principal-agent logic when explaining the observed variation in sexual 
violence across armed groups. Butler et al. (2007) argue that sexual violence is driven by out-of-
control agents (fighters), and that sexual violence therefore is less likely to be widespread when 
combatants are subjected to tight control. In line with this, Wood (2009) finds initial evidence that 
armed groups’ perpetration of sexual violence partly depends upon groups’ internal hierarchy and 
chains of command. Information asymmetries and anarchy within armed organizations can allow 
rank-and-file soldiers to pursue private interests – such as rape – without the commanders’ 
knowledge. When military hierarchies are well-functioning, commanders can more effectively 
enforce decisions and punish undisciplined soldiers (Koos 2015; Weinstein 2005). However, other 
scholars use the same principal-agent framework to claim the opposite, that the presence of clear 
command structures in fact makes it easier for commanders to order acts of sexual violence. A 
recent study by Schneider et al. (2015:1341) questions the generalizability of the anarchy-argument 
and posits that commanders can order sexual violence through a combination of sanctions and 
rewards. The authors’ analysis of a survey conducted with former Congolese combatants shows 
that ordered rape is more likely in organizations where soldiers fear punishment. Furthermore, 
Sawyer et al. (2016) combine insights about both the ideological and organizational bases of armed 
group behavior, and argue that groups desire or need to be perceived as legitimate actors matter 
for the level of sexual violence that they engage in. 
 
In addition to internal culture and structure, it is argued that an armed group’s aim in a conflict 
might influence the level of sexual violence that the group perpetrates. Groups that are driven by 
long-term goals of governing, and see themselves as the start of a new social order, might refrain 
from carrying out widespread sexual atrocities against their future constituencies, in order to gain 
support and legitimacy (Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2013; Wood 2009, 2010). Others argue that sexual 
violence can serve as an instrument for ethnic cleansing during secessionist conflicts (Cohen 2013; 
Bloom 1999; Farr 2009). A related, yet different argument emphasizes that territorial control, rather 
than the overarching aim of a conflict, matters for the type of violence in which a rebel group 
engages. Kalyvas (2006) argues that armed groups are less prone to perpetrate indiscriminate 
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violence against civilians in areas where they exert territorial control. A few other scholars argue 
that sexual violence is more likely to occur in areas of contested control, since sexual violence can 
be perpetrated as to forcibly displace people and ensure that these people will not return (Bloom 
1999; Sharlach 2000; Cohen 2013).  
 
Recruitment practices  
A pioneering study by Cohen (2013) offers an alternative explanation for the observed variation in 
sexual violence, focusing on recruitment practices. Cohen (2013) argues that social cohesion is 
important for armed groups since it improves the group’s chances of survival and reduces the risk 
that members will defect or attempt to escape. According to Cohen (2013), social cohesion is 
unlikely to arise spontaneously amongst armed groups that recruit their member through 
abduction. Group-perpetration of sexual violence may therefore be used as a tool for building 
internal cohesion and creating a coherent fighting force. The findings from her cross-national 
analysis show that rebel groups and state forces that forcibly recruit their members commit higher 
levels of sexual violence than groups that do not use forced recruitment. Thus, recruitment 
mechanisms appear to be essential factors when it comes to understanding the variation in conflict-
related sexual violence.  
 
2.4 Research Gap 
While Cohen’s (2013) findings are some of the most interesting within the field, she fails to 
adequately consider that other types of recruitment practices might also influence the levels of 
perpetrated sexual violence. One such recruitment practice, that many rebel groups rely on, is the 
recruitment of child soldiers. Currently, no study has neither theoretically nor empirically 
investigated how child soldier recruitment influences rebel groups’ perpetration of sexual violence. 
Only one study, by Cohen and Nordås (2015), touch very briefly upon the issue when examining 
sexual violence by pro-government militia groups. However, child soldiering is only mentioned due 
to methodological reasons, as the authors use child soldier recruitment as a proxy for forced 
recruitment (of adults) in their statistical analysis. The potential link between sexual violence and 
child soldier recruitment in itself is not discussed at all throughout their article. Nevertheless, the 
literature on child soldiering gives us reasons to believe that there is in fact a direct relationship 
between child recruitment and rebel groups’ use of sexual violence, a relationship that so far has 
been overlooked by scholars.   
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3. Theoretical Arguments and Hypothesis 
The following chapter first provides a definition of the term child soldier and a brief overview of 
the issue of child soldiering. Next, I develop several theoretical arguments as for why child 
soldiering is associated with higher levels of sexual violence by rebel groups. Based on these 
arguments, a hypothesis is derived.   
 
3.1 Child Soldiering: A Brief Overview 
According to UNICEF (2007:7), a child soldier is defined as “any person below 18 years of age 
who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed group.” The 18-years threshold has 
also been adopted in the UN’s Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict (OPCAC) (UN 2000). Even prior to that, two of the most influential reports on children 
in conflict, the UN Machel Report (Machel 1996) and the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, used the 18-years threshold in their definitions (Haer and Böhmelt 2016a:169; UN 1989).1 
Note that the official UN definition also refers to children that, for instance, are recruited to work 
at checkpoints, as spies, cooks or sex slaves, in addition to serving as active combatants. Thus, a 
child soldier does not necessarily carry a weapon.  
 
Just like sexual violence, child soldiering is not a new phenomenon in armed conflicts (Wessells 
2006). The international community has since long condemned the use of child soldiers, and as of 
today, 159 countries have signed the OPCAC (Faulkner 2016). Despite this, child soldiering 
practices have altered significantly during the last decades (Haer and Böhmelt 2016a). An increasing 
number of children are being recruited by armed groups, especially rebel groups. Furthermore, 
child soldiers are more frequently used as active combatants, rather than being providers of 
secondary support functions such as cooking or spying (Haer and Böhmelt 2016a:155; Singer 
2006). Lasley and Thyne (2015) explain that rebel groups, in contrast to state-actors, did not take 
part in the development of the international norms against child soldiering and cannot sign on to 
any of the formal agreements. Consequently, many rebel groups are not as influenced by these 
norms and continue to pursue the recruitment of children (Faulkner 2016:213). It is tremendously 
difficult to accurately estimate exactly how many children are recruited in armed conflicts around 
the world, however, some reports indicate numbers around approximately 200,000 to 300,000 
children in current conflicts (Dabbagh 2011; Lasley and Thyne 2015; Vautravers 2008). While rebel 
groups are not the only organizations that recruit children, Tynes and Early (2015) highlight that 
                                                 
 
1 This threshold is however sometimes a subject of controversy (e.g., see Tynes 2011).   
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they have fewer constrains and more to gain from doing so than, for example, governments do. 
Regarding the actual recruitment process of child soldiers, many children are abducted or in other 
ways forced into joining rebel groups. However, scholars have also noted that it is not unusual that 
children join on a voluntarily basis (Haer 2017; Peters 2004).2 Children are often attracted to 
soldiering since it offers them a purpose, an identity and resources such as food and protection, 
which they otherwise could not have obtained or afforded in civilian life (Wessells 2006:4). Whereas 
it is commonly known that many children, especially girls, are sexually abused as sex slaves by high-
ranking commanders, less scholarly attention has been given to the fact that child soldiers, 
especially boys, also are forced to participate in acts of sexual violence against others. Therefore, it 
is important to gain a better understanding of child soldiers’ roles as members of rebel groups.  3 
 
3.2 How Child Soldiering Influences Rebels’ Perpetration of Sexual Violence 
Even though there are no studies that systematically examine the relationship between child soldier 
recruitment and rebel groups use of sexual violence, by using insights from the child soldier 
literature, I can derive four theoretical arguments as for why groups that recruit children are likely 
to engage in more sexual violence.  
 
First, committing acts of sexual violence can not only allow rebel groups that abduct their members 
to create and maintain a coherent fighting force, as suggested by Cohen (2013). It can also serve as 
a tool for indoctrination of child soldiers, regardless of how they were recruited. When a child 
becomes a member of a rebel group, carrying out violent acts becomes an inevitable part of the 
child’s daily life. Even if a child joins voluntarily, the child soon discovers that attempts to leave 
the group or refusals to participate in violence come with extreme penalties, such as threats of 
death (Human Rights Watch 2008). When child soldiers engage in violence, they often believe that 
they have no other choice than doing so, especially if they previously have seen other children 
getting killed when disobeying or if they have been beaten themselves (Human Rights Watch 2008). 
Fear works as a motivation for child soldiers to stay in the group and obey orders (Özerdem and 
Podder 2011). On a related note, Schneider et al. (2015) demonstrate that combatants that fear 
punishment by their superiors are more likely to have heard orders that the combatant’s unit shall 
                                                 
 
2  It is debated whether it is possible to talk about “voluntary” recruitment when it comes to child soldiers (Haer 2017). 
For instance, it can be argued that children lack cognitive skills to make a fully informed decision, or that they are 
indirectly forced due to lack of other options. Yet, scholars find that there are several cases in which children are 
associated with armed groups and where physical coercion or intimidation cannot explain their presence (Hart 2008).  
3 It is worth noting that a few scholars have recently begun to examine what consequences child soldiering have on 
conflict dynamics in general. These studies show that child soldiering can prolong conflicts, make them more likely 
recur and increase rebel groups’ fighting capacities (Haer and Böhmelt 2016a, 2016b, 2017).  
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engage in sexual violence. Moreover, it has been reported that young boys on a regular basis were 
forced to rape women and girls as part of the initiation processes of several rebel factions in Liberia 
(UNICEF 2005). A social worker in Liberia revealed that “boys from both factions have told us 
that there were initiation procedures when they joined in which they were forced to kill or rape 
someone or perform some other atrocity […]. This was supposed to demonstrate that they were 
brave enough to be soldiers” (Human Rights Watch 2008). If the children failed to prove 
themselves as worthy soldiers, they would be shot by the rebel leaders. Hence, during child soldiers’ 
initiation process, sexual violence can serve as a tool for introducing young members into a violent 
male culture. In other words, forcing young boys to participate in such violence represents a 
symbolic ritual intended to turn young boys into men (Coulter 2009). A former child soldier who 
was a member of a rebel group in northern Chad told UNICEF that “we [the child soldiers] were 
forced to kill without fear, raping girls and women, to prove that we were very strong” (UNICEF 
2014). Furthermore, ex-combatants from Timor-Leste said that rape was used an initiation ritual 
for young boys, during interviews with the UNICEF (2001). One boy explained that once he joined 
an armed group, his first contact with violence was participating in gang rape. The boy said that 
“they threatened me and told me that I had to kill people and rape women. […] If we obeyed their 
orders they would pay attention to us and be kind to us, but if you didn’t obey the order…” 
(UNICEF 2001:63-65).  
 
In addition, it is recognized that sexual violence can be used during the initiation process as a way 
for rebel groups to break existing ties between child soldiers and their families (Carpenter 2007). 
Referring to the Sierra Leonean civil war, Carpenter (2007:81) mentions that “in order to sever 
young soldiers’ ties with their families, and to demonstrate their loyalty to the armed group, some 
boys and young men were forced to rape their sisters, mothers and even grandmothers.” After 
committing such acts against family and community members, it may become difficult for the 
children to return to their communities. Consequently, the children may start to perceive the rebel 
group as their family instead, something which makes them exceptionally obedient (Schauer and 
Elbert 2010; Singer 2006). As Özerdem and Podder (2011:42) puts it: “in the absence of a family, 
children’s need for security, to have someone to love and respect may be transferred to military 
commanders.” As distancing the children from their community fosters intense loyalty and 
compliance, it can be beneficial for rebel groups to break child soldiers’ ties with their families 
through sexual violence.  
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Second, as children do not yet possess the same psychological characteristics as adults, they are 
more vulnerable and easier for rebel groups to exploit, which can make it attractive for rebel groups 
to recruit children. In general, children are said to be less difficult to manipulate than adults 
(Wessells 2006; Tynes 2011). As children have not developed the same cognitive skills as adults 
(Wessells 2006), it is easier to convince them that they are fighting for an important cause, and to 
order them to commit violence, including sexualized violence, as a part of that cause. Wessells 
(2006:34-35) points out that children through violent means or threats of violence can be taught 
to obey commands that most adults would oppose or manage to evade. Once successfully trained, 
child soldiers will remain much more loyal, dedicated and willing to carry out commands than adult 
combatants (Gates and Reich 2010; Haer and Böhmelt 2016a). Thus, due to children’s undeveloped 
cognitive functions, it may be easier for a rebel commander to order sexual violence if a group 
consists of many child soldiers. 
 
Furthermore, Singer (2006) argues children have an underdeveloped understanding of death, which 
prevents them from fully understanding the consequences of their actions. Child soldiers are 
therefore more likely to take risks than adults and they also often feel that they are invulnerable 
(Brett and Specht 2004). As a result, child soldiers may become even more fierce and brutal fighters 
than their adult peers (Haer and Böhmelt 2016a). A child-care worker in Liberia reported that 
“some children were the most vicious, brutal fighters of all. […] Children learn by imitation; they 
saw killings and then when their commanding officers ordered them to kill, they did” (Human 
Rights Watch 1994). Moreover, Hecker and Haer (2015) find that child soldiers are more likely to 
engage in a more diverse set of violent acts - including sexual violence, mutilations and massacres 
- than adults. Psychological studies indicate that child combatants, as compared to adults, 
demonstrate a higher level of aggressiveness because they perceive violence in a more positive and 
fascinating fashion (Schauer and Elbert 2010; Wessells 2006). To induce aggression even more, 
and reduce feelings of fear before forcibly committing atrocities, many rebel groups also use drugs 
on the child soldiers (Maclure and Denov 2006). The drugs help to disengage the child’s action 
from any sense of reality and blunt moral inhibitions (Kirby 2015). A camp rehabilitation leader in 
Sierra Leone explained that when children were given drugs, they would do just about anything 
that they were commanded to do (Wessells 2006). Hence, rebel groups more easily exploit children 
and can use the child soldiers as tools for perpetrating a wide range of atrocities.  
 
Third, even if child soldiers are not directly ordered by their commanders to commit sexual 
violence, children and teenagers are much more susceptible to peer pressure and have a stronger 
  
 
16 
desire to fit in than adults. When a child belongs to a rebel group, the child depends upon the other 
members for survival, something which makes peer pressure even more powerful (Wessells 
2006:70). On a related note, authors have recently begun to presume that armed groups engage in 
sexual violence mainly as a “practice”, rather than using it as a weapon of war (e.g., Cohen 2013, 
2016). Thus, child soldiers may be more likely to participate in a group’s “practice” of sexual 
violence, due to peer pressure from older group members. Moreover, scholars have argued that 
the fear of being disliked by a group is a major driving force for the perpetration of gang rape 
during wartime, whereas sexual desires are less frequently mentioned as the underlying reason 
(Bijleveld et al. 2007; Henry et al. 2003). By participating in for example gang rape, participants can 
brag about the acts they committed, in order to appear strong and masculine (Cohen 2013). Wood 
(2014) claims that social pressure is very prominent during military training, and if social pressure 
has a strong effect on adults, one could expect that it has an even stronger one on children. Young 
perpetrators of gang rape in the Netherlands revealed that they chose to participate in the rapes 
simply because they wanted to fit in and were afraid of what the consequences might be if they 
refrained (Cohen 2016:28). Additionally, an ex-child soldier from Sierra Leone remembers that 
after he was forced into raping his sister, he expressed that he did not want to not take part in such 
violence again, but that this caused his fellow combatants to mock him (Cohen 2016:124).  
 
Finally, as previously discussed, child soldiers often provide logistical and supportive functions in 
addition to participating actively in combat. Such functions can, for example, include standing 
guard, gathering intelligence, cooking or cleaning. Haer and Böhmelt (2016a:157) argue that child 
soldiers provision of support functions indirectly contributes to increasing a rebel group’s fighting 
capacity, as the child soldiers’ logistical support allows other members to engage in combat tasks 
rather than other tasks. Following this logic, child soldiers’ presence in a rebel group might enable 
other rebels to more easily engage in sexual violence, such as gang rape, even if the child soldiers 
themselves are not actively participating. In line with his, several former child soldiers have stated 
that they had to stand guard and look out for enemy combatants in order to give warnings signs, 
while their fellow peers took part in gang rape (Cohen 2016:35).  
 
To conclude: first, I argue that rebel groups force children into participating in sexual violence 
during their indoctrination and initiation process, both as to turn them into “real” soldiers and as 
a way to sever the ties between the children and their families. Second, because children have not 
developed the same psychological characteristics and cognitive functions as adults, it is easier for 
rebel groups to manipulate children and to force them into committing violent acts. Thus, it may 
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be easier for a rebel commander to order sexual violence if a group consists of many child soldiers. 
These characteristics also make it more likely that children will participate in sexual violence due 
to group pressure, even if the violence is not directly ordered. Finally, even if the child soldiers 
themselves are not actively taking part in sexual violence, they can provide supporting functions 
that enable other older combatants to more easily engage in sexual violence. In light of all these 
arguments, I expect that rebel groups that rely on child soldier recruitment perpetrate higher levels 
of sexual violence than rebel groups that refrain from recruiting children. 
 
3.3 Hypothesis 
H1: Rebel groups that recruit child soldiers are more likely to perpetrate higher levels of sexual 
violence than rebel groups that refrain from child recruitment.  
  
4. Research Design 
This chapter presents the data used to conduct the empirical analysis, the operationalization of the 
variables and the corresponding summary statistics, as well as the method employed to estimate 
the results.  
 
4.1 Data 
In my analysis, I consider all active rebel groups in intrastate armed conflicts between 1989 and 
20094 as identified in versions 3.3 and 3.4 of the Non-State Actor (NSA) dataset (Cunningham et 
al. 2009, 2013). The dataset is an expansion of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research 
Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflict Data and uses all of the conflict-dyads from the 
UCDP Dyadic Dataset (Harbom et al. 2008; Gleditsch et al. 2002). In order for an armed intrastate 
conflict to be coded as active it has to: 1) involve the government of a state, 2) take place mainly 
within the state, 3) involve organized opposition forces, 4) be fought over either the control of 
territory and/or government, and 5) result in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year 
(Cunningham et al. 2013:519). A dyad consists a government and an opposing rebel group. A 
conflict can include more than one dyad. If a government is opposed by four rebel groups over 
the same incompatibility, the conflict is made up of four dyads (Gleditsch et al. 2002). The unit of 
analysis is a conflict-dyad-period. This means that a government is paired with a rebel group in one 
time period, in which the parameters of the conflict-dyad remain unchanged (Haer and Böhmelt 
2016a:159). The data allow for changes over time, since when any of a dyad’s attributes changes, a 
                                                 
 
4 The time span is chosen due the data availability of my dependent variable. 
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new observation is coded for the dyad (Cunningham et al. 2013:519). In contrast to highly aggregate 
research designs, which use data on the country- or conflict-level, my research design disaggregates 
conflicts to the level of the rebel group. By taking this approach, I can refrain from lumping all 
opposition organizations together as “rebels”, when a conflict has multiple actors (Salehyan et al. 
2014). Since the purpose of my study is to examine if rebel groups’ recruitment of child soldiers 
affect the levels of sexual violence perpetrated by the rebel groups, the dyadic data has a clear 
advantage as compared to non-dyadic data, simply because conflict-level data would not allow me 
to take the variation across groups within the same conflict into account. In total, my sample 
comprises 257 unique rebel groups and 298 conflict-dyad-periods between 1989-2009.5  
 
4.2 Operationalization  
4.2.1 Dependent Variable: Sexual Violence Prevalence  
I use data from the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) data set (Cohen and Nordås 2014) 
for information about rebel groups’ perpetration of sexual violence. The SVAC data cover the 
years 1989-2009 and defines sexual violence as (1) rape, (2) sexual slavery, (3) forced prostitution, 
(4) forced pregnancy, (5) forced sterilization/abortion, (6) sexual mutilation, and (7) sexual torture. 
This definition resembles those of the UN and ICC, as presented in chapter 2, and does not exclude 
female perpetrators or male victims, both of which are observed in the data (Cohen and Nordås 
2014:7). The sexual violence prevalence measure is an estimate of the relative magnitude of reported 
sexual violence perpetrated by a rebel group in a particular year (Cohen and Nordås 2014:7). The 
prevalence is coded according to an ordinal scale, ranging from 0 to 3, with 0 indicating cases where 
no sexual violence was reported; 1 indicating cases with “some” reported sexual violence (less than 
25 incidents or victims); 2 indicating cases where sexual violence was “commonly/frequently” 
reported (25-999 incidents or victims); and 3 indicating cases where sexual violence was reported 
as “massive” (more than 1000 incidents or victims). The scores are based on information from 
reports across three different sources: US State Department, Amnesty International, and Human 
Rights Watch.6 In addition to these sources, the authors also consulted all relevant special reports 
published by the International Crisis Group (ICG) and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic 
Control on Armed Forces (DCAF) reports on sexual violence in armed conflict (Cohen and 
Nordås 2014:18).  
 
                                                 
 
5 After accounting for missing values on the dependent variable. For a list of all included conflict-dyad-periods, see 
table 10 in Appendix. 
6 These sources are some of the most commonly used in quantitative human rights research.  
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The SVAC dataset builds on the first cross-conflict data collection on rape during civil wars, 
compiled by Cohen (2013). As compared to Cohen (2013), the SVAC dataset has several 
advantages such as the employment of a broad definition of sexual violence that does not only 
include wartime rape. Moreover, whereas the data from Cohen (2013) only distinguishes between 
group type when it comes to the perpetrator, i.e. if perpetrator was a state or rebel actor, the SVAC 
dataset contains information on sexual violence for each specific armed group, mentioned by name. 
Besides the SVAC dataset, only a few authors have attempted to collect data on conflict-related 
sexual violence or wartime rape. These efforts are limited to covering only single years, a small 
number of conflicts, or do not include non-state actors such as rebel group (e.g., Butler et al. 2007; 
Farr 2009; Green 2006). Consequently, the SVAC dataset is the most comprehensive data 
collection on sexual violence in armed conflicts and the most useful one for the purpose of this 
study. Even though there are many advantages of the SVAC dataset, one should be aware that 
underreporting is an issue when attempting to measure sexual violence. To minimize potential 
sources of bias, the authors took several measures such as testing an alternative data collection 
process under which information was obtained from all available online sources, including policy 
reports and scholarly literature, data triangulation and intercoder reliability testing (Cohen and 
Nordås 2014:422 for further details). Neither of these measures revealed systematic bias in the 
information coded from the main sources. Thus, despite these issues, the authors are able to reliably 
measure the relative magnitude of sexual violence across armed groups.  
 
Because underreporting of sexual violence by victims is a problem, one should treat any estimation 
of the numbers of victims as conservative (Cohen and Nordås 2014:421). Following this logic, I 
use the highest reported level of sexual violence across the three sources in the SVAC dataset as 
the dependent variable in my analysis. Accordingly, both the authors behind the dataset (Cohen 
and Nordås 2015) and Loken (2017) take this approach in two recently published studies.  
 
4.2.2 Key Explanatory Variable: Child Soldier Recruitment  
The core explanatory variable for this thesis concerns the recruitment of child soldiers by rebel 
groups. The information on rebel groups’ use of child soldiers comes from a newly complied 
dataset, The Child Soldier Dataset (CSDS), by Haer and Böhmelt (2016a). In general, it is difficult 
to obtain reliable data on the use of child soldiers, and earlier attempts to collect systematic cross-
sectional data on child soldiers have been limited to covering only a certain region or a few number 
of armed groups (see e.g., Beber and Blattman 2013; Tynes 2011). The CSDS is the most extensive 
data compiled on child soldiering as it contains data that go beyond binary indicators for child 
recruitment, while at the same time ensuring a comprehensive coverage of rebel groups worldwide. 
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The rebel groups in the CSDS are identified by the NSA dataset versions 3.3 and 3.4. The CSDS 
follows the same structure and practices as these data. The dataset is based on information provided 
by independent reports from, inter alia, Child Soldiers International, Human Rights Watch, 
Amnesty International, Global March against Child Labour, as well as various independent news 
and academic sources in different languages (Haer and Böhmelt 2016a:160). I use an ordinal 
variable that captures the use of child soldiers on a three-point scale for each rebel group pertaining 
to a conflict-dyad-period in the NSA dataset, (Haer and Böhmelt 2016a:160). The CSDS employs 
UNICEF’s (2007) definition of a child soldier as any person below the age of 18 who has been 
recruited or used by a rebel group. A conflict-dyad-period in which a rebel group did not use any 
child soldiers at all is coded as 0; a conflict-dyad-period in which some child soldiers were recruited 
is coded as 1 (less than 50 percent of the rebel group consisted of child soldiers); and a conflict-
dyad-period in which many child soldiers were recruited is coded as 2 (more than 50 percent of the 
group consisted of child soldiers). Utilizing this ordinal variable allows me to take the variation in 
the size of child soldier recruitment across rebel groups in to account.  
 
4.2.3 Alternative Explanations and Control Variables 
In addition to my key explanatory variable, I include a number of control variables that according 
to the previous literature might influence the level of perpetrated sexual violence.  
 
Forced Recruitment: First, I need to account for Cohen’s (2013, 2016) argument that armed groups 
that rely on forced recruitment are more likely to perpetrate rape as a tool for bonding and creating 
social cohesion. By including a measure for forced recruitment, I can make sure that my child 
soldier variable does not merely serve as a proxy for forced recruitment, as suggested by Cohen 
and Nordås (2015). As the authors do not theorize about how the levels of forced recruitment 
influence sexual violence (i.e. how many of the group members were recruited by force), I create a 
dummy variable for forced recruitment. The variable takes on the value 1 if there were indications of 
forced recruitment of child soldiers, and 0 if there were no indications that the children were 
forcibly recruited.7 The data come from a recent extension of the CSDS and is based on 
information from the same type of sources as the main explanatory variable (Faulkner et al. 2017). 
The CSDS offers the most comprehensive data on the forced recruitment of children available,8 
and utilizing this newly compiled information gives me the advantage of being able to control for 
                                                 
 
7 By doing this I also avoid the risk of making wrong assumptions about the actual size of the number of forcibly 
recruited child soldiers.  
8 Beber and Blattman (2013) also made an effort to collect some information about the recruitment practices of child 
soldiers, but this information only covers 19 African groups.  
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the forced recruitment of child soldiers on the level of the rebel group. In comparison, Cohen’s 
(2013, 2016) measure for forced recruitment is not on the level of the group, but merely indicates 
if any of the rebel groups active in a conflict forcibly recruited their members, aggregating all groups 
together to one big group of “rebels”.  
 
Territorial Control: The existing literature suggests that sexual violence is more prevalent in areas of 
contested control (Salehyan et al. 2014). Moreover, Sawyer et al. (2016) find that rebel groups that 
exercise control over a territory are more likely to perpetrate sexual violence. In contrast, Kalyvas 
(2006) shows that armed groups use less indiscriminate violence against civilians in areas where 
they enjoy strong territorial control. To control for these competing arguments, I use a measure 
for territorial control from the NSA dataset (Cunningham et al. 2009, 2013). The variable is a binary 
indicator for whether a rebel group controls a territory (1) or not (0).  
 
Central Command Strength: Several scholars claim that armed groups’ internal hierarchies matter for 
the level of perpetrated sexual violence (e.g., Wood 2009). Whereas some authors argue that clear 
and strong command structures make it easier to order sexual violence, others suggest that a strong 
central command allows commanders to exhibit tighter control over their combatants as to 
prohibit sexual violence. In addition, internal discipline within rebel groups may also be a predictor 
for civilian abuse such as child soldiering (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Lasley and Thyne 
2015). To account for these potential mechanisms, I control for a rebel group’s central command 
strength, using data from the NSA dataset (Cunningham et al. 2009, 2013). Following Lasley and 
Thyne (2015), I create a binary variable indicating whether a rebel group has a high or medium 
strong central control (1), or a low central control or no central leadership at all (0).  
 
Political Wing: The recent literature has suggested that rebel groups with strong ideologies may 
perpetrate less sexual violence, as they are more likely to exhibit restraints against civilian abuse. 
However, ideology is not easily defined and comparable data on the types and content of rebel 
groups’ ideologies is difficult to find. One exception is Hoover Green (2016), who made an effort 
to compile data on whether a rebel group has a communist ideology. Unfortunately, her data only 
covers 75 rebel groups, which would force me to reduce my already relatively small sample by more 
than 25 percent.9 It is also worth noting that the literature remains rather inconclusive about what 
types of ideologies could give rise to a restraint on violence against civilians. Since Stanton (2009, 
                                                 
 
9 Besides, her data is currently inaccessible and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to collect comprehensive data on 
rebel groups’ ideologies.  
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2013) finds that rebel groups with political wings connected to their military organizations to a 
larger extent exhibit restraint, I use the presence of a political wing as a proxy for the presence of an 
ideology. The variable indicates whether a rebel group has an alleged, acknowledged or explicit link 
to a political wing (1) or not (0). The data is retrieved from the NSA dataset (Cunningham et al. 
2009, 2013). 
 
Duration: A longer conflict-period means more opportunities for perpetrating sexual violence and 
for sexual violence to diffuse between rebel groups as a “practice” (Cohen and Nordås 2015:889). 
Moreover, a longer conflict-period also means more opportunities for rebel groups to recruit 
children (Tynes and Early 2015). Therefore, I need to control for the duration of a conflict. I include 
a count variable measuring the number of years that elapsed from the start of a conflict-dyad-
period until its end. The variable is based on information from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002). By controlling for the length of a conflict-dyad-period, I also control 
for any remaining time-based dependencies (Haer and Böhmelt 2016a:164).  
 
Conflict Aim: On behalf of the ethnic hatred argument, scholars claim that sexual violence is more 
likely to be widespread in secessionist conflicts, since it can be used as a tactic to signal that “life 
together is finished” (Hayden 2000:32). Moreover, Lasley and Thyne (2015) argue that the conflict 
aim may also affect rebel groups’ behavior when it comes to child soldier recruitment. Therefore, 
I include a variable that captures the conflict aim. The information is obtained through the 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, which contains information about a conflict’s contested 
incompatibility (Gleditsch et al. 2002). According to the UCDP, a conflict can concern either 
government, territory or both. A conflict over government concerns control of the whole state. A 
territorial conflict on the other hand is about control of a part of the state (secession or autonomy). 
Since my sample does not contain any dyad-conflicts that are considered to have mixed aims, I 
create a binary variable indicating if a conflict concerns government (0) or territory (1).  
 
Civil War Dummy: There is a possibility that conflicts with high levels of sexual violence simply are 
conflicts that also are more intense in terms of lethal violence (Butler et al. 2007; Cohen 2013, 
2016). Moreover, the literature on child soldiering show that rebel groups in civil wars are more 
prone to use child soldiers (Gates and Reich 2010). To control for conflict intensity, I include a 
binary variable indicating whether a conflict-dyad-period belongs to a civil war (1) or not (0). The 
data come from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, in which a civil war is defined as an 
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armed conflict that averaged 1000 or more annual battle deaths over the conflict period (Gledistch 
et al. 2002).  
 
Fertility Rates: As many authors argue that gender inequalities contribute to making sexual violence 
more prevalent during wartime, I control for the level of gender inequality in a country where a 
conflict took place using a measure of the country’s fertility rate. In general, measuring gender 
inequalities is difficult and there is a scarcity of reliable and comparable cross-national data on the 
issue.10 However, Caprioli et al. (2009) and Cohen (2016) claim that the fertility rate is the best 
available proxy, as it reflects both cultural factors such, as personal choices, as well as structural 
inequalities and discrimination against women, such as lower levels of education, income, and 
political power.11 The data on fertility rates is taken from the World Bank Development Indicators 
and is measured as the total number of births per woman, by country and year (World Bank 2017). 
I use the average value of this variable for each conflict-period. 
 
Religious Fractionalization: Many scholars suggest that ethnic hatred facilitates sexual violence, since 
it can play an important role in dominating and humiliating opponents of another ethnic group. 
Since most quantitative studies find no relationship between ethnic fractionalization, or ethnic 
wars, and the perpetration of sexual violence (e.g., Butler et al. 2007; Cohen 2013; Loken 2017; 
Hoover Green 2016), I employ an alternative yet related measure in my analysis. The variable 
religious fractionalization captures how religiously fragmented a country in which a conflict took place 
is. The measure is taken from Fearon and Laitin (2003:78) and reflects the probability that two 
randomly selected individuals in a country belong to different religious groups. A higher number 
indicates a more fractionalized society. The variable is time invariant.  
 
Magnitude of State Failure: Since the previous literature suggests that state collapse and lawlessness 
increase the opportunity for perpetrating sexual violence, I control for the magnitude of state failure. I 
measure state capacity using the variable “magfail” from the Political Task Force Instability (PITF) 
dataset which indicates the failure of state authority (Marshall et al. 2009). The variable ranges from 
1 (adverse regime change with no significant weakening of state institutions) to 4 (complete collapse 
of state authority). Following other scholars (e.g., Cohen 2013; Williams and Masters 2011), I add 
                                                 
 
10 For example, the UNDP offers two different gender variables: the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) and the 
Gender-Related Development Index (GDI). However, these were only recorded from 1995, which makes them less 
useful for my study. Moreover, because these measures entailed significant biases for developing countries, they were 
replaced in 2010 with a new measure, the Gender Inequality Index (GII) (Cohen 2013:482; UNDP 2015).   
11 Cohen (2013) argues that it is unlikely that wartime rape affects national fertility rates, as the chance of pregnancy 
per rape is rather low (see Holmes et al. 1996). 
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the value 0 to the scale to indicate cases where there was no state failure. I use the highest value 
recorded in a conflict-period.  
 
Resources: Some scholars emphasize that greed can play an important role in civilian abuse. Rebel 
groups may be more prone to engage in rape when conflicts are driven by “economic 
endowments”, as such violence can be used to terrorize people in areas with valuable resource 
(Cohen and Nordås 2015; Weinstein 2005). Moreover, groups that have access to material 
resources can increasingly abuse civilians as they do not depend on extensive civilian support 
(Weinstein 2005). Furthermore, rebel groups’ ability to recruit children might also be influenced by 
the wealth of the group (Dallarie 2011; Haer and Böhmelt 2016a). Therefore, I control for the 
presence of lootable resources in a country where a conflict took place. I use data from Buhaug and 
Lujala (2005), Gilmore et al. (2005), Lujala et al. (2007) and Lujala (2009), which indicate the 
presence of drugs, oil, diamonds and/or gemstones in a country. I follow Haer and Böhmelt 
(2016a) and create an additive variable that ranges from 0 to 4. A higher value indicates the presence 
of more resources in the country in which an insurgent group is operating.  
 
ln(Population): At last, I include the natural logarithm of a country’s population size, seeing as it can 
affect the conflict dynamics. States with greater populations offer more opportunities for violence 
against citizens, and a larger population also implies that there is a larger pool of recruits, including 
children, for the rebels (Haer and Böhmelt 2017:7, 2016b; Salehyan et al. 2014). The data is 
retrieved from the World Bank Development Indicators (World Bank 2017). I use the average 
value over the period 1989-2009.  
 
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics and the variation inflation factors (VIFs) for the 
variables. A correlation matrix shows that the models in my analysis do not have any problems 
with multicollinearity, since none of the variables included are correlated with a value higher than 
0.8.12 The VIF scores are well below the common threshold value of 5 for all variables, which 
confirms that no multicollinearity is present in the data (O’Brien 2007). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
12 See table 5 in Appendix. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics  
 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max VIF 
Sexual violence prevalence 
Child Soldier Recruitment 
Forced Recruitment 
Territorial Control   
Central Command Strength   
Political Wing                        
Duration 
Conflict Aim 
Civil War Dummy 
Fertility Rates               
Religious Fractionalization     
Magnitude of State Failure    
Resources 
ln(Population)                        
298 
298 
297 
297 
296 
297 
298 
297 
289 
298 
297 
298 
294 
298 
0.34 
0.93 
0.40 
0.34 
0.73 
0.37 
4.29 
0.40 
0.47 
4.74 
0.40 
0.73 
2.13 
16.94 
0.77 
0.64 
0.49 
0.47 
0.44 
0.48 
5.99 
0.49 
0.50 
1.93 
0.20 
1.44 
1.12 
1.58 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.22 
0 
0 
0 
13.21 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
42 
1 
1 
7.79 
0.78 
4 
4 
20.77 
 
1.49 
1.57 
1.16 
1.04 
1.09 
1.18 
2.13 
2.02 
1.53 
1.16 
1.17 
1.86 
2.39 
 
4.3 Estimation Strategy 
To estimate the impact of child soldier recruitment on the levels of perpetrated sexual violence by 
rebel groups, I use an ordered probit to model the likelihood of sexual violence falling into one of 
the four ordered categories (Cohen 2016). Whereas a linear model, such as an OLS regression, 
assumes that these categories are evenly spaced, the ordered probit model relaxes this assumption 
given that the categories are ordered rather than only categorical.13 As it is difficult to determine if 
the distance between no reports of sexual violence (coded as 0) and “some” reports (coded as 1), 
is the same as the distance between “some” reports and “frequent” reports (coded as 2), or as 
between “frequent” reports and “massive” reports (coded as 3), the linearity assumption might be 
violated. Therefore, an ordered probit regression is the most suitable model choice for the 
dependent variable (Cohen 2016:85). In order to account for potential intra-group dependencies 
across the conflict-dyad-periods and heteroscedasticity, I use robust standard errors clustered on 
government-rebel dyads. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
13 The choice between a logit and probit can be considered a stylistic one, as there is little practical difference between 
estimates (Dey and Astin 1993). I chose a probit model to get a higher degree of comparability with previous studies 
within the field (e.g., Cohen 2013, 2016).  
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5. Results  
This chapter presents the findings and substantive results of the empirical analysis. Furthermore, a 
series of robustness tests are carried out.  
 
5.1 Main Analysis 
 
Table 2. Sexual Violence Perpetrated by Rebel Groups: Ordered Probit Model 
 
DV: Sexual Violence Prevalence Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Child Soldier Recruitment 0.825*** 0.687*** 0.664*** 0.701*** 
 (0.165) (0.174) (0.176) (0.196) 
Forced Recruitment  0.290 0.195 0.172 
  (0.199) (0.204) (0.219) 
Territorial Control  0.484*** 0.470** 0.400** 
  (0.181) (0.195) (0.196) 
Central Command Strength  -0.275 -0.269 -0.423** 
  (0.200) (0.194) (0.196) 
Political Wing  -0.228 -0.212 -0.193 
  (0.215) (0.221) (0.232) 
Duration  0.005 0.010 0.030** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) 
Conflict Aim   -0.404 -0.323 
   (0.345) (0.338) 
Civil War Dummy   0.070 -0.027 
   (0.321) (0.305) 
Fertility Rates    -0.025 
    (0.052) 
Religious Fractionalization    0.819* 
    (0.478) 
Magnitude of State Failure    0.070 
    (0.063) 
Resources    -0.137 
    (0.091) 
ln(population)    -0.135 
    (0.096) 
Constant cut1 1.730*** 1.662*** 1.487*** -0.828 
 (0.201) (0.265) (0.366) (1.574) 
Constant cut2 2.184*** 2.146*** 1.990*** -0.294 
 (0.209) (0.277) (0.373) (1.550) 
Constant cut3 2.804*** 2.785*** 2.643*** 0.407 
 (0.280) (0.336) (0.424) (1.563) 
Observations 298 293 284 279 
Pseudo R-2 0.091 0.128 0.137 0.174 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on government-rebel-dyad. 
Sexual violence prevalence is the maximum reported prevalence across the three 
sources in the SVAC dataset. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2 displays the results from the ordered probit regression models. I estimate four different 
models to ensure that my findings are robust across different model specifications. The first model 
shows the bivariate relationship between my core explanatory variable and the dependent variable. 
Model 2 includes the core explanatory variable, as well as control variables on the group-level (rebel 
group characteristics). In model 3, control variables on the conflict-level are added (conflict 
characteristics). Finally, country-level variables (country characteristics in the rebel groups’ 
countries of origin) are added in model 4, which is the full model including all control variables. 
 
The findings presented in table 2 show that there is strong support for my hypothesis. The 
coefficient for child soldier recruitment is positive and significant at the .01 level. Thus, child soldier 
recruitment is associated with increased reports of rebel-perpetrated sexual violence. In other 
words, rebel groups that recruit (more) child soldiers are more likely perpetrate higher levels of 
sexual violence. The findings remain statistically significant at the .01 level across all model 
specifications, even when covariates on the group-, conflict-, and country-level are added. 
Furthermore, another important finding is that the measure for forced recruitment does not 
significantly influence the prevalence of sexual violence.14 The variable is introduced to isolate the 
effect of child soldier recruitment per se, in order to ensure that the child recruitment variable does 
not merely proxy forced recruitment, as suggested by Cohen and Nordås (2015). My results show 
the core explanatory variable remains positive and significant, even after controlling for the forced 
recruitment of child soldiers. Hence, child soldier recruitment has a positive impact on perpetrated 
sexual prevalence, regardless of how the children were recruited.  
 
Out of the other group-level control variables introduced in model 2, territorial control has a 
positive and significant impact on sexual violence prevalence at the .01 level. These results suggest 
that rebel groups that control territory are more likely to perpetrate sexual violence than those 
groups that do not control any territory. Once conflict and country factors are added in models 3 
and 4, territorial control remains positive and significant (then at the .05 level) while two additional 
group-level covariates also turn out statistical significance at the .05 level: central command 
strength and the duration of a conflict-dyad-period. The coefficient for central command strength 
is negative, which indicates that rebel groups that have a high or medium strong central control are 
                                                 
 
14 To further ensure that the means through which child soldiers are recruited do not influence the level of perpetrated 
sexual violence, I estimated the effect of forced recruitment on sexual violence prevalence using a sub-sample, 
including only the rebel groups that did engage in child soldier recruitment. The results show that forced recruitment 
is not a statistically significant predictor for sexual violence prevalence amongst groups that use child soldiers. See table 
9 in Appendix. 
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less likely to perpetrate sexual violence than those that have low central control or no central 
leadership at all. The duration of a conflict-dyad-period appears to, as expected, have a positive 
impact on sexual violence prevalence. Thus, as the duration of a conflict increases, so does the 
likelihood of observing higher levels of rebel-perpetrated sexual violence. The variable indicating 
whether a rebel group has a political wing does not have a statistically significant effect on sexual 
violence prevalence.  
 
Out of the conflict- and country-control factors introduced in models 3 and 4, only religious 
fractionalization turns out as a statistically significant predictor for the levels of sexual violence. 
Neither conflict aim, national fertility rates, the magnitude of state failure, population size nor the 
presence of lootable resources in a rebel group’s country of origin seem to influence the level of 
sexual violence perpetrated by the group. 
 
5.2 Substantive Effects 
Even though my results display a strong and robust relationship between child soldier recruitment 
and sexual violence, it is difficult to directly interpret the size of the effect from the ordered probit 
regression. To determine the substantive impact of child soldier recruitment on sexual violence 
prevalence, I calculated the likelihood of each level of sexual violence when the child soldier 
recruitment variable takes on the value 0 (no children recruited), 1 (some children recruited) and 2 
(many children recruited) using CLARIFY (Tomz et al. 2003). Table 3 displays the mean predicted 
probabilities of rebel-perpetrated sexual violence at each level of the dependent variable, given that 
a group recruits no, some, or many child soldiers. The probabilities are based on model 4 in table 
2, including all control variables set at their mean values. The substantive results show that rebel 
groups that recruit many child soldiers are 5.2, 10.5, and 23.6 times more likely to commit sexual 
violence at levels 1, 2, and 3, respectively, than those groups that do not recruit children. Rebel 
groups that recruit some child soldiers are 2.8, 3.8, and 5.2 times more likely to commit sexual 
violence at levels 1, 2, and 3, respectively, than those groups that do not recruit any children. The 
results of my analysis are therefore the first indication that child soldier recruitment might indeed 
increase the levels of sexual violence perpetrated by rebel groups during armed conflict. 
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Table 3. Mean Predicted Probabilities With and Without Child Soldier Recruitment 
 
 Child Soldier 
Recruitment =0 
Child Soldier 
Recruitment =1 
Child Soldier 
Recruitment =2 
Pr(Sexual Violence Prevalence=0) 0.9489404 0.8353778 0.6085311 
Pr(Sexual Violence Prevalence =1) 0.0344253 0.0970808 0.1782157 
Pr(Sexual Violence Prevalence =2) .0137481 0.0526117 0.1449106 
Pr(Sexual Violence Prevalence =3) 0.0028863 .0149297 0.0683426 
Note: The mean predicted probabilities are based on the ordered probit model with robust standard errors cluster on 
government-dyad, including all control variables from the model 4 set at their mean values. Two-tailed t-tests confirm 
that the differences in the mean predicted probabilities at levels 0, 1, 2 and 3 are statistically significant at the .01 or 0.05 
level. 
 
In addition, I also calculated first difference estimate for child soldier recruitment. The first 
difference estimate shows the change in the predicted probability (in percentage points) of 
observing an outcome as a given independent variable is moved from its minimum to its maximum 
value, while holding all other variables constant at their mean (King et al. 2000; Tomz et al. 2003). 
Accordingly, I calculated the change in probability of observing the highest level of sexual violence 
(level 3), as the child soldier recruitment variable is moved from its minimum (0) to its maximum 
value (2), holding all other variables constant at their mean value. The estimates are displayed in 
figure 1. The figure also depicts the change in the predicted probability of observing the highest 
level of sexual violence for the four control variables that turned out statistically significant in the 
ordered probit regression, when moved from their minimum to maximum value.  
 
Figure 1. Substantive Effects: First Difference Estimates for the Highest Level of Sexual 
Violence  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values indicate first difference estimations (•), horizontal bars pertain to 90 percent confidence intervals.  
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In substantive terms, the likelihood that a rebel group perpetrates the highest level of sexual 
violence increases by 6.5 percentage points when child soldier recruitment moves from its 
minimum to its maximum value. Moreover, the likelihood that a rebel group perpetrates sexual 
violence at levels 1 or 2 or increases with 14.3 and 13.1 percentage points respectively when child 
soldier recruitment moves from its minimum to maximum value is (values not presented in the 
figure). These findings support my hypothesis since they show that child soldier recruitment has a 
sizable effect on sexual violence, even when accounting for several other factors. Only the duration 
of a conflict-period has a larger substantive effect (14.1 percentage points) than child soldiers 
recruitment on the probability of observing sexual violence at levels 1, 2 and 3, when moved from 
it minimum to maximum value. However, it is worth noting that the duration variable ranges from 
0 years all the way up to 42 years. Moving the variable from its minimum to its maximum value 
therefore requires a rather large increase in a conflict-period’s duration, considering that the mean 
value is 4.29 years. 
 
5.3 Robustness Checks 
In order to increase the confidence in my findings, I performed a series of robustness checks and 
alternative specifications of the ordered probit regression models from table 2. 
 
First, in order to provide further assurance concerning the coding of the levels of sexual violence, 
I test if a different aggregation of the dependent variable alters my findings. As suggested in Cohen 
(2016), I collapsed the dependent variable to create a binary variable, grouping categories 1-3 of 
the original dependent variable together. Thus, the new binary dependent variable captures whether 
a rebel group engaged in any sexual violence or not. Moreover, because there are only 11 
observations of the highest level of sexual violence (level 3) when using the ordinal dependent 
variable, these observations could potentially belong to an outlier category, which could lead to an 
overestimation of my results. By re-calculating my models using a binary dependent variable for 
sexual violence I am also able ensure that my results are not driven by these potential outliers. 
Table 4 shows that the main results from the ordered probit model remain robust to this change, 
the only difference being that the measure for religious fractionalization now turns out statistically 
insignificant.  
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Table 4. Robustness Check: Binary Dependent Variable (Probit Model) 
 
DV: Sexual Violence Occurrence Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
    
Child Soldier Recruitment 0.721*** 0.698*** 0.771*** 
 (0.200) (0.202) (0.220) 
Forced Recruitment 0.216 0.122 0.108 
 (0.212) (0.219) (0.238) 
Territorial Control  0.645*** 0.646*** 0.586*** 
 (0.203) (0.224) (0.227) 
Central Command Strength -0.437* -0.439* -0.588*** 
 (0.233) (0.229) (0.225) 
Political Wing -0.178 -0.155 -0.131 
 (0.238) (0.249) (0.254) 
Duration 0.008 0.014 0.032* 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) 
Conflict Aim  -0.513 -0.496 
  (0.408) (0.401) 
Civil War Dummy  0.005 -0.086 
  (0.382) (0.373) 
Fertility Rates   -0.050 
   (0.054) 
Religious Fractionalization   0.699 
   (0.511) 
Magnitude of State Failure   0.013 
   (0.065) 
Resources   -0.154 
   (0.118) 
ln(population)   -0.145 
   (0.111) 
Constant -1.647*** -1.408*** 1.305 
 (0.277) (0.429) (1.774) 
Observations 293 284 279 
Pseudo R-2 0.188 0.205 0.252 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on government-rebel-
dyad. The dependent variable indicates whether any sexual violence was 
reported by a rebel group across the three sources in the SVAC dataset.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Second, it is suggested that rebel groups that recruit child soldiers might not be a random sample 
(Bakaki and Hinkkainen 2016; Beber and Blattman 2013; Haer and Böhmelt 2016a). Therefore, I 
employed a recursive bivariate probit model based on the guidelines in Maddala (1983) and Greene 
(2012) as an additional robustness test.15 It is possible that the factors that influence rebel groups’ 
perpetration of sexual violence also could have influenced their recruitment of child soldiers during 
the conflict in the first place. Not accounting for this two-stage process could under- or 
overestimate of the impact of child soldiering on sexual violence prevalence (Haer and Böhmelt 
                                                 
 
15 For practical examples, see Bakaki and Hinkkianen (2016) and the appendix of Haer and Böhmelt (2016a). 
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2016a). To account for this potential selection bias (the non-random assignment of child soldiers), 
the recursive bivariate probit model uses two separate equations, one selection equation and one 
outcome equation, with correlated disturbances (Bakaki and Hinkkainen 2016; see appendix of 
Haer and Böhmelt 2016a). For these equations, I must define two different dependent variables. 
For the outcome equation, I use the binary variable indicating whether a rebel group engaged in 
sexual violence (due to the bivariate model’s requirement of binary dependent variables). For the 
selection equation, I as use a dummy variable for whether a rebel group recruited child soldiers or 
not. The two equations are then estimated at the same time, while the correlation in equations’ 
error processes is taken into account (Bakaki and Hinkkianen 2016:559; Haer and Böhmelt 
2016a).16 The results from the bivariate probit model show that the rho () value is statistically 
insignificant, which means that there is no evidence that the model’s two equations are correlated.17 
Furthermore, the findings are in line with the results of the ordered probit models (table 2). Thus, 
my model is not affected by a selection into child soldier recruitment and the results from the 
ordered probit regressions are therefore unbiased and robust.  
 
Third, instead of controlling for the religious fractionalization in a rebel group’s country of origin, I 
employ Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) corresponding measure for ethnic fractionalization. The measure 
captures the likelihood that two randomly chosen people from a state belong to different ethno-
linguistic groups. The ethnic fractionalization variable turns out statistically insignificant and does 
not alter my main results.18 Only one change can be observed amongst the control variables as the 
coefficient for a country’s population is now negative and significant at the .10 level. This suggests 
that an increasing population size reduces the likelihood of rebel group-perpetrated sexual violence, 
which is contrary to the common expectations.  
 
Fourth, I estimated a model considering the average level of state failure recorded in a conflict-
period, instead of the maximum recorded value. In addition to the measure for the magnitude of 
state failure taken from the PITF dataset, I also considered the natural logarithm of the average 
annual GDP per capita for the period 1989-2009, in each state where a conflict took place, as an 
alternative proxy for state capacity.19 Neither of these variables alter the estimated effects for the 
                                                 
 
16 As the bivariate probit model requires one variable in the selection equation to be excluded from the outcome 
equation, I excluded the civil war dummy in the second equation. 
17 Results are displayed in table 6 in Appendix. 
18 Results are displayed in model 5, table 7 in Appendix. 
19 Several authors have shown that state capacity is highly correlated with GDP per capita, and the measure has been 
commonly used as a proxy in cross-sectional studies (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003). The data is obtained from the 
World Bank Development Indicators and is in current US dollars (World Bank 2017).  
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core explanatory variable and the group-level factors, however, religious fractionalization loses its 
significance.20  
 
At last, even though an ordered probit regression is the best choice considering the nature of my 
(ordinal) dependent variable, estimating models using this particular method might make it harder 
for models to converge, given the relatively small number of observations in my sample (Cohen 
and Nordås 2015:894). Therefore, I re-estimated my results using an OLS regression model with 
robust standard errors clustered on government-rebel dyad. The main findings regarding child 
soldier recruitment remain the same as when using the ordered probit model.21 
 
6. Discussion and Limitations 
The empirical analysis presented in the previous section provides strong support for the hypothesis 
in this thesis. There appears to be a consistent and significant association between child soldier 
recruitment and higher levels of perpetrated sexual violence by rebel groups. This finding remains 
robust across several alternative model specifications and robustness checks. Moreover, the size of 
the effect appears to be rather large, seeing as rebel groups that recruit children are far more likely 
to perpetrate sexual violence at levels 1, 2 and 3 as compared to groups that do not use child 
soldiers. Since no study has yet systematically examined the relationship depicted in this paper, my 
results are a first indication that the recruitment of children might indeed increase the likelihood 
that rebel groups will engage in more sexual violence. The findings shine light upon the disturbing 
fact that not only are child soldiers subjected to sexual violence and other horrendous violent acts, 
but they are also forced to perpetrate and participate in such acts. Hence, it appears as if rebel 
groups are able to use child soldiers as a tool for perpetrating a variety of atrocities during armed 
conflict.  
 
Another important finding is that the forced recruitment of child soldiers does not have a 
statistically significant impact on the levels of sexual violence. Therefore, my results indicate that 
child soldier recruitment per se, regardless of how the children were recruited, is associated with 
more sexual violence by rebel groups. The insignificant result for the forced recruitment variable 
lends further support for the theoretical mechanisms I suggest, as these do not depend upon how 
the child soldiers were recruited. Moreover, this discovery challenges Cohen and Nordås’ (2015) 
assumption that child soldier recruitment is a reliable proxy for forced recruitment, at least when 
                                                 
 
20 See model 6 and 7, table 7 in Appendix.  
21 Results displayed in table 8 in Appendix. 
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it comes to rebel groups (taking into account that their study only looks at pro-government 
militias).  
 
In terms of the remaining group-level control variables, my results also demonstrate support for 
other existing arguments in the literature. The negative coefficient for central command strength 
supports the anarchy-argument, which suggests that sexual violence is driven by out-of-control 
fighters and information asymmetries within rebel groups (e.g., Butler et al. 2007, Wood 2009). 
Thus, it appears as if internal hierarchies and chains of command indeed might influence sexual 
violence, as argued by for instance Wood (2009). Moreover, rebel groups that control territory are 
more likely to engage in sexual violence. This implies that sexual violence can serve as an instrument 
for ethnic cleansing or be used to displace people, if perpetrated within or close to the controlled 
area (Bloom 1999; Cohen 2013; Sharlach 2000). However, the results regarding territorial control 
should be interpreted with caution seeing as the data on sexual violence is not georeferenced, 
meaning that am I not able to control for the exact location of the violent incidents. Continuing, 
the positive effect of duration may be because additional conflict years simply provide more 
opportunities for perpetrating sexual violence, or that a longer conflict-period allows for sexual 
violence to diffuse between different armed groups as a “practice” (Cohen and Nordås 2015:889). 
Furthermore, despite that the recent literature emphasizes that armed groups’ ideologies play an 
important role in restraining sexual violence, I do not find support for this argument when using 
the presence of a political wing as a proxy for ideology. In addition, more intense conflicts, i.e. civil 
wars, are not associated with higher levels of sexual violence. Thus, my results reaffirm previous 
findings that conflicts with more sexual violence are not simply conflicts with more lethal violence 
(Cohen 2013, 2016; Cohen and Nordås 2015).  
 
As for the factors observed at the country-level, I find weak support for some of the most 
conventional wisdoms about the determinants of sexual violence in armed conflict. Neither the 
variable capturing gender inequality nor the variable for the magnitude of state failure turn out 
statistically significant. The insignificant results for gender inequalities mirror those of Cohen 
(2013, 2016) and Loken (2017). In support of authors like Bloom (1999), the results from the 
ordered probit model show that rebel groups in more religiously fragmented states are more likely 
to engage in higher levels of sexual violence. However, the coefficient for religious fractionalization 
does not remain significant across a series of robustness tests. Even though gender inequality, state 
failure and religious fractionalization might be linked to other aspects of armed conflict, once a 
conflict has begun, these factors do not seem to explain why some rebel groups perpetrate high 
levels of sexual violence whereas others do not.  
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In general, my findings suggest that group-level factors are better predictors for the level of sexual 
violence perpetrated by rebel groups than conflict- or country-level ones. This is hardly surprising 
since these country-level measures should not be able to account for why rebel groups within the 
same conflict, exposed to the same societal gender norms, living under the same conditions of 
lawlessness and existing in an ethnically or religiously divided conflict, still vary in the level of 
perpetrated sexual violence. 
 
While my analysis shows a strong and consistent association between child soldier recruitment and 
rebel-perpetrated sexual violence, there are still a few limitations of my study. First, it is possible 
that there are other factors not included in my models that could be causing rebel groups to engage 
in both child recruitment and high levels of sexual violence. Such factors could include rebel 
groups’ internal cultures, norms and morale. On a related note, a binary variable denoting whether 
a rebel group has a political wing may be a rough proxy for the presence or absence of an ideology. 
However, as research on the variation in sexual violence across armed groups is a relatively new 
field of study, many characteristics of rebel groups are not yet documented in a systematic fashion. 
Nonetheless, I have employed the best proxies available for some of the most difficult-to-measure 
variables in order to address any issues of omitted variable bias.  
 
Second, there are a few limitations of the SVAC data used for the dependent variable in this study, 
as discussed in chapter four. For instance, the reporting of sexual violence in armed conflicts might 
be uneven over time. It is possible that human rights organizations gained increased interest in the 
issue after the high-profile conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda and thus started reporting 
more about sexual violence, as compared to previous years (Cohen and Nordås 2014). This might 
imply that the severity of sexual violence in armed conflicts prior to this is underestimated. 
Furthermore, it is plausible that different types of conflicts may have gained uneven amounts of 
attention in terms of international reporting. However, as described in chapter four, the authors 
behind the SVAC dataset employed several measures to minimize these problems. Nevertheless, 
the unequal interest in sexual violence across conflicts and over time could potentially lead to an 
over- or underestimation of the results.  
 
Third, it is important to note that I am not able to test which of the four proposed mechanisms, 
developed in the theoretical section, are the primary driving forces of my results. Since it is beyond 
the scope of this study to examine the mechanisms at the micro-level, it is not possible to say with 
certainty what mechanisms are in place. Lastly, one should also be careful about generalizing the 
  
 
36 
results of my analysis to other armed groups than rebel groups, since incentives and internal group 
dynamics might differ between different types of armed actors.  
 
7. Conclusion 
As research has shown that levels of sexual violence not only vary across conflicts, but also across 
armed groups, scholars have recently come to examine what armed group characteristics can 
explain this variation. Even though recruitment practices have been highlighted as an important 
factor for understanding the variation in sexual violence, no study has yet considered the impact 
of child soldier recruitment. With this thesis, I aimed to fill this gap by examining both theoretically 
and empirically how the recruitment of child soldiers might influence the levels of sexual violence 
perpetrated by rebel groups. Thus, this thesis sought to answer the following question. Do rebel 
groups that recruit child soldiers perpetrate more sexual violence? 
 
Theoretically, I purposed four interrelated mechanisms for why child soldier recruitment increases 
the levels of sexual violence perpetrated by rebel groups. First, I argue that rebel groups force 
children to participate in acts of sexual violence during their indoctrination and initiation process, 
both in order to turn them into “real” soldiers and as a way to sever the ties between the children 
and their families. Second, because children have not developed the same psychological 
characteristics and cognitive functions as adults, it is easier for rebel groups to manipulate and make 
child soldiers extremely obedient. Thus, it may be easier for a rebel commander to order sexual 
violence if a group consists of many child soldiers. Third, these characteristics also make it more 
likely that child soldiers will participate in sexual violence due to peer pressure, even when not 
directly ordered. Finally, even if the children themselves are not actively taking part in acts of sexual 
violence, their presence can enable other older combatants to more easily carry out sexual violence. 
Based on these arguments, I hypothesize that rebel groups that recruit child soldiers are more likely 
to perpetrate higher levels of sexual violence than those that refrain from using child soldiers.  
 
To test my hypothesis empirically, I analyzed rebel groups active in armed conflicts between 1989-
2009, using a newly compiled dataset on child soldier recruitment combined with data on sexual 
violence from the SVAC dataset. The results show that child soldiering indeed is associated with 
higher levels of sexual violence perpetrated by rebel groups. Moreover, the size of the effect 
appears to be relatively large. In other words, the answer to my research question is: yes, rebel 
groups that recruit child soldiers are more likely to engage in sexual violence than groups that do 
not recruit children. My findings contribute to the ongoing effort to better understand the variation 
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in sexual violence across armed groups, as well as the recent literature examining the consequences 
of child soldiering. 
 
While my thesis sheds light upon a previously unexamined relationship, one study is not sufficient 
in order to fully address this important issue. Thus, there are several avenues for further research. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, I am not able to test which of the four theoretical mechanisms 
is the primary driving force of my results. Scholars could therefore through in-depth case studies 
try to sort out which underlying mechanisms are in place. Qualitative studies could also provide 
more detailed insights to rebel groups’ exploitation of children, as well as give a more 
comprehensive picture of child soldiers’ experiences during armed conflict. In addition, scholars 
should more thoroughly examine whether there are factors, such as norms and culture, which make 
rebel groups more likely to both commit high levels of sexual violence and recruit child soldiers. 
Moreover, given that my study only looks at sexual violence and child recruitment by rebel groups, 
future studies could examine if the same relationship can be observed for state forces or other 
armed actors. As for the more theoretical implications of my study, scholars should consider to 
primarily include group-level factors when analyzing the variation in sexual violence across armed 
actors, as country- and conflict- level factors appear to be weak predictors. Generally, future 
academic studies on sexual violence should think about incorporating measures of child soldier 
recruitment into their empirical models for more thorough results. 
 
Regarding policy implications, my findings give an indication to international policymakers that 
two of the worst aspects of armed conflict, sexual violence and child soldiering, may be interlinked. 
Knowing what factors increase the likelihood of widespread sexual violence can potentially help 
policymakers to prevent and respond to such events in the future. Thus, policymakers should be 
aware that conflicts in which children are being recruited by rebel groups are also at high risk for 
widespread sexual violence. Since I have shown that child soldiering, in addition to being a brutal 
deprivation of children’s human rights, can bring about negative externalities for third parties, it is 
of utter importance that the international community take efforts towards establishing more 
effective measures against child recruitment. Furthermore, policymakers should consider 
developing more holistic policies aimed at targeting both child soldier recruitment and sexual 
violence, as the two seem to be connected. Lastly, my thesis underscores how vulnerable children 
are to numerous forms of abuse and exploitation during armed conflict. Even though post-conflict 
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs usually contain child-specific 
components, the academic community has recognized that these programs have problems with 
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addressing child soldiers’ different experiences and needs in the aftermath of a conflict. When 
designing and implementing DDR programs, policymakers should keep in mind that child soldiers 
not only are victims of various forms of abuse, but that they also are forced to perpetrate atrocities, 
including sexualized violence, against others.  
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Table 6. Robustness Check: Bivariate Probit Model 
 
 Bivariate Probit Model (1) 
Outcome Equation (Sexual Violence Occurrence) 
Child Soldier Recruitment 0.901*** 
 (0.235) 
Forced Recruitment 0.094 
 (0.240) 
Territorial Control 0.528** 
 (0.210) 
Central Command Strength -0.584*** 
 (0.224) 
Political Wing -0.112 
 (0.245) 
Duration 0.029 
 (0.018) 
Conflict Aim -0.440 
 (0.271) 
Fertility Rates -0.054 
 (0.051) 
Religious Fractionalization 0.661 
 (0.513) 
Magnitude of State Failure 0.018 
 (0.064) 
Resources -0.179 
 (0.116) 
ln(population) -0.136 
 (0.114) 
Constant 1.091 
 (1.842) 
Selection Equation (Child Soldier Recruitment) 
Territorial Control 0.504** 
 (0.221) 
Central Command Strength -0.109 
 (0.201) 
Duration 0.108*** 
 (0.034) 
Conflict Aim -0.125 
 (0.266) 
Resources 0.248*** 
 (0.085) 
Civil War Dummy 0.286 
 (0.262) 
Constant -0.285 
 (0.302) 
(rho) -0.221 
Observations 279 
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Table 7. Robustness Checks: Alternative Control Variables 
 
DV: Sexual Violence Prevalence Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
    
Child Soldier Recruitment 0.716*** 0.702*** 0.699*** 
 (0.198) (0.197) (0.184) 
Forced Recruitment 0.195 0.161 0.194 
 (0.220) (0.224) (0.223) 
Territorial Control 0.389** 0.393** 0.371* 
 (0.192) (0.195) (0.194) 
Central Command Strength -0.421** -0.406** -0.399** 
 (0.198) (0.194) (0.196) 
Political Wing -0.196 -0.199 -0.139 
 (0.232) (0.234) (0.227) 
Duration 0.026* 0.032** 0.028** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Conflict Aim -0.281 -0.323 -0.221 
 (0.329) (0.338) (0.335) 
Civil War Dummy -0.040 -0.028 0.029 
 (0.308) (0.307) (0.299) 
Fertility Rates -0.018 -0.018 -0.063 
 (0.053) (0.052) (0.071) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.286   
 (0.400)   
Magnitude of State Failure 
(Highest Values) 
0.060   
 (0.064)   
Resources -0.145 -0.136 -0.112 
 (0.092) (0.094) (0.094) 
ln(population) -0.174* -0.133 -0.177* 
 (0.094) (0.098) (0.095) 
Religious Fractionalization  0.774 0.752 
    
  (0.481) (0.495) 
Magnitude of State Failure 
(Average Values) 
 0.075 
(0.077) 
 
    
ln(GDP/capita)   -0.108 
   (0.126) 
Constant cut1 -1.633 -0.781 -2.402 
 (1.495) (1.605) (2.040) 
Constant cut2 -1.104 -0.248 -1.878 
 (1.474) (1.582) (2.040) 
Constant cut3 -0.412 0.452 -1.172 
 (1.479) (1.601) (2.087) 
Observations 279 279 267 
Pseudo R-2 0.169 0.174 0.171 
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Table 8. Robustness Check: OLS Regression Results 
 
DV: Sexual Violence Prevalence Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Child Soldier Recruitment 0.415*** 0.331*** 0.329*** 0.345*** 
 (0.089) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) 
Forced Recruitment  0.165 0.126 0.127 
  (0.109) (0.109) (0.111) 
Territorial Control  0.214** 0.211** 0.162* 
  (0.099) (0.099) (0.098) 
Central Command Strength  -0.106 -0.110 -0.139 
  (0.101) (0.102) (0.103) 
Political Wing  -0.145 -0.130 -0.140 
  (0.094) (0.097) (0.101) 
Duration  0.002 0.004 0.012* 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Conflict Aim   -0.215* -0.193 
   (0.125) (0.121) 
Civil War Dummy   0.049 -0.023 
   (0.132) (0.132) 
Fertility Rates    -0.012 
    (0.025) 
Religious Fractionalization    0.473* 
    (0.256) 
Magnitude of State Failure    0.030 
    (0.038) 
Resources    -0.060 
    (0.055) 
ln(population)    -0.049 
    (0.039) 
Constant -0.044 0.022 0.096 0.919 
 (0.062) (0.108) (0.153) (0.646) 
Observations 298 293 284 279 
R-squared 0.12 0.163 0.184 0.230 
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Table 9. Sub-Sample: The Effect of the Forced Recruitment of Child Soldiers on Sexual 
Violence  
DV: Sexual Violence Prevalence Model 1 
  
Forced Recruitment 0.342 
 (0.232) 
Territorial Control 0.447** 
 (0.226) 
Central Command Strength -0.433* 
 (0.221) 
Political Wing -0.345 
 (0.258) 
Duration 0.039*** 
 (0.015) 
Conflict Aim -0.363 
 (0.390) 
Civil War Dummy 0.022 
 (0.345) 
Fertility Rates 0.004 
 (0.065) 
Religious Fractionalization 1.133** 
 (0.514) 
Magnitude of State Failure 0.060 
 (0.067) 
Resources -0.098 
 (0.101) 
ln(population) -0.232** 
 (0.097) 
Constant cut1 -2.849* 
 (1.601) 
Constant cut2 -2.330 
 (1.599) 
Constant cut3 -1.642 
 (1.612) 
Observations 213 
Pseudo R-2 0.146 
 
 
Table 10. Conflict-dyad-periods Included in the Analysis 
 
Location Rebel Group Name Conflict Start  Conflict End  
Afghanistan Taliban 2003-06-04 2005-12-31 
Afghanistan Taliban 2006-01-01 2010-12-31 
Afghanistan Jamiat-i-Islami 1996-01-01 1996-12-31 
Afghanistan Hezb-i-Islami 1992-06-01 1995-12-31 
Afghanistan Hezb-i-Islami 2008-01-01 2010-12-31 
Afghanistan Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami 1993-03-08 1995-12-31 
Afghanistan Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan 1980-01-01 1989-12-31 
Afghanistan Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction 1980-01-01 1991-12-31 
Afghanistan Taliban 1995-02-01 1996-09-28 
Afghanistan Jamiat-i-Islami 1989-03-01 1992-04-28 
Afghanistan Hezb-i-Islami 1989-03-01 1992-04-28 
Afghanistan Hezb-i-Wahdat 1989-02-28 1995-12-31 
Afghanistan UIFSA 1996-10-13 2001-11-12 
Afghanistan Military Faction 1990-03-06 1990-03-08 
Algeria FIS 1992-12-01 1997-10-01 
Algeria Exile and Redemption 1991-12-01 1991-12-31 
Algeria GIA 1993-01-01 2003-12-31 
Algeria AQIM 1999-01-01 2010-12-31 
Angola UNITA 1992-09-01 1992-12-31 
Angola UNITA 1993-01-01 1997-12-31 
Angola FLEC–FAC 1994-01-01 1996-12-31 
Angola FLEC–FAC 1997-01-01 1998-12-31 
Angola FLEC–FAC 2002-01-01 2009-12-31 
Angola FLEC 1991-06-03 1997-12-31 
Angola FLEC 2002-01-01 2002-12-31 
Angola UNITA 1989-01-01 1991-05-01 
Angola UNITA 1998-08-01 2002-02-22 
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Azerbaijan Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh 1991-12-30 1994-05-04 
Azerbaijan Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh 2005-01-01 2005-12-31 
Azerbaijan Husseinov Military Faction 1993-06-04 1993-06-21 
Azerbaijan OPON forces 1995-03-15 1995-03-17 
Bangladesh JSS/SB/Shanti Bahini 1975-02-01 1992-11-15 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-04-07 1995-12-14 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1993-04-01 1994-03-18 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia 1993-10-03 1995-12-14 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Serbian irregulars 1992-04-07 1995-12-14 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatian irregulars 1993-04-01 1994-03-18 
Burundi Palipehutu 1991-11-26 1992-12-31 
Burundi CNDD 1994-11-26 1998-05-08 
Burundi Frolina 1997-01-01 1997-12-31 
Burundi CNDD-FDD 1998-06-07 2003-12-31 
Burundi Palipehutu-FNL 1997-01-01 2008-12-31 
Cambodia FUNCINPEC 1997-06-10 1997-12-31 
Cambodia Khmer Rouge/PDK 1990-01-01 1998-10-25 
Cambodia Khmer Rouge/PDK 1979-01-09 1989-12-31 
Cambodia KPNLF 1990-01-01 1991-10-23 
Cambodia FUNCINPEC/ANS 1990-01-01 1991-10-23 
Cambodia FUNCINPEC/ANS 1982-01-01 1989-12-31 
Central African Republic UFDR 2006-10-30 2006-12-31 
Central African Republic CPJP 2009-06-12 2010-12-31 
Central African Republic Military faction (forces of André Kolingba) 2001-05-28 2001-06-06 
Central African Republic Faction of Francois Bozize 2001-10-26 2002-12-31 
Chad Revolutionary Forces of 1 April 1989-10-20 1989-12-31 
Chad MOSANAT 1989-03-03 1989-12-31 
Chad Islamic Legion 1989-01-01 1990-12-31 
Chad CSNPD 1992-08-31 1994-08-11 
Chad CNR 1992-12-31 1994-12-31 
Chad MPS 1990-03-31 1990-12-02 
Chad FNT 1992-12-31 1994-10-16 
Chad MDD [-FANT] 1991-12-31 1993-12-31 
Chad MDD [-FANT] 1997-01-01 1997-12-31 
Chad FARF 1997-11-30 1998-05-07 
Chad MDJT 1999-12-31 2002-12-31 
Chad FUCD 2005-01-01 2006-12-31 
Chad RAFD 2006-01-01 2006-12-31 
Chad UFDD 2006-01-01 2007-12-31 
Chad AN 2008-01-01 2008-12-31 
Chad Military faction (forces of Maldoum Bada Abbas) 1991-01-01 1991-12-31 
Chad UFR 2009-04-17 2009-12-31 
Colombia FARC 1978-01-01 2010-12-31 
Colombia ELN 1984-01-01 2010-12-31 
Colombia EPL 1984-01-01 1990-12-31 
Colombia EPL 2004-01-01 2004-12-31 
Comoros MPA 1997-09-03 1997-09-07 
Congo Ninjas 1993-11-11 1994-12-31 
Congo RCD 1998-08-11 2001-12-31 
Congo MLC 1998-11-07 2001-12-31 
Congo RCD Faction 1999-01-01 2000-12-31 
Congo-Brazzaville Ninjas 1998-12-14 1999-12-29 
Congo-Brazzaville Cocoyes 1997-10-18 1999-12-29 
Congo-Brazzaville Ntsiloulous 1998-12-14 2002-12-31 
Cote D’Ivoire MPCI 2002-09-19 2002-12-31 
Cote D’Ivoire MPIGO 2002-11-11 2003-12-31 
Cote D’Ivoire MJP 2002-12-03 2003-12-31 
Cote D’Ivoire FN 2004-06-07 2004-12-31 
Croatia Serbian irregulars 1992-07-01 1992-12-31 
Croatia Serbian Republic of Krajina 1992-01-01 1995-11-12 
Democratic Republic of Congo AFDL 1996-10-18 1997-05-17 
Democratic Republic of Congo  CNDP 2006-01-01 2008-12-31 
Democratic Republic of Congo  BDK 2007-01-01 2008-02-28 
Democratic Republic of Congo BDK 2008-03-01 2008-12-31 
Djibouti FRUD 1991-11-12 1994-12-26 
Djibouti FRUD – AD 1999-01-01 1999-12-31 
Egypt al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya 1993-03-17 1998-12-31 
El Salvador FMLN 1980-09-02 1991-12-31 
Eritrea EIJM 1997-04-30 1999-12-31 
Eritrea EIJM 2003-01-01 2003-12-31 
Ethiopia EPRDF 1989-01-01 1991-12-31 
Ethiopia Military faction (forces of Amsha Desta and Merid Negusie) 1989-05-16 1989-12-31 
Ethiopia ARDUF 1996-04-26 1996-12-31 
Ethiopia EPLF 1975-01-01 1991-05-28 
Ethiopia ONLF 1994-02-26 2010-12-31 
Ethiopia OLF 1977-01-01 1995-12-31 
Ethiopia OLF 1996-01-01 2009-12-31 
Ethiopia al-Itahad al-Islami 1993-10-13 1999-12-31 
Georgia Republic of Abkhazia 1992-08-16 1993-12-01 
Georgia Zviadists 1992-03-16 1993-10-15 
Georgia Republic of South Ossetia 1992-06-09 1992-07-14 
Georgia Republic of South Ossetia 2004-08-19 2004-08-19 
Georgia Republic of South Ossetia 2008-08-08 2008-12-31 
Guatemala URNG 1982-03-07 1995-12-31 
Guinea RFDG 2000-09-01 2001-12-31 
Guinea-Bissau Military Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice 1998-06-07 1999-05-07 
Haiti Military faction (forces of Himmler Rebu and Guy Francois) 1989-01-01 1989-12-31 
Haiti Military faction (forces of Raol Cédras) 1991-01-07 1991-01-07 
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Haiti FLRN 2004-01-01 2004-02-29 
Haiti OP Lavalas (Chimères) 2004-08-05 2004-12-31 
India ATTF 1992-10-12 1993-08-23 
India ATTF 1997-01-01 1999-12-31 
India NLFT 1995-10-01 2006-12-31 
India NSCN 1992-07-31 2000-12-31 
India UFLA 1990-02-01 2009-12-31 
India ABSU 1989-03-16 1990-12-31 
India BDSF/NDFB 1993-01-01 2004-12-31 
India PLA 1992-01-01 1998-12-31 
India PLA 2004-01-01 2006-12-31 
India UNLF 1994-08-21 2009-12-31 
India Kashmir Insurgents 1989-12-11 2010-12-31 
India Sikh insurgents 1983-08-20 1993-12-31 
India Naxalites/PWG 1990-01-01 2004-09-20 
India MCC 1992-04-06 2004-09-20 
India CPI–Maoist 2005-01-30 2010-12-31 
India NSCN - K 2005-01-01 2007-12-31 
India KCP 2008-01-01 2009-12-31 
India DHD – BW 2008-01-01 2008-12-31 
India PREPAK 2008-01-01 2009-12-31 
India PULF 2008-11-09 2008-12-31 
India NDFB – RD 2009-01-13 2010-12-31 
India KNF 1997-07-13 1997-12-31 
Indonesia Fretilin 1992-12-15 1992-12-31 
Indonesia Fretilin 1997-05-31 1998-12-31 
Indonesia Fretilin 1985-01-01 1989-12-31 
Indonesia GAM 1990-06-22 1991-06-15 
Indonesia GAM 1999-01-01 2005-10-12 
Iran Mujahideen e Khalq 1986-01-01 1993-12-31 
Iran Mujahideen e Khalq 1997-01-01 2001-12-31 
Iran KDPI 1979-03-15 1996-12-31 
Iran PJAK 2005-01-01 2009-12-31 
Iran Jondullah 2006-01-01 2009-12-31 
Iraq KDP/DPK 1979-01-01 1990-12-31 
Iraq KDP/DPK 1991-01-01 1991-12-31 
Iraq PUK 1976-01-01 1990-12-31 
Iraq PUK 1991-01-01 1996-12-31 
Iraq Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) 1991-01-01 1996-12-31 
Iraq Al-Mahdi Army 2004-01-01 2008-12-31 
Iraq Ansar al-Islam 2004-01-01 2007-12-31 
Iraq ISI/Jama’at Al-Tawhid wa Al-Jihad 2004-01-01 2005-12-31 
Iraq ISI/Jama’at Al-Tawhid wa Al-Jihad 2006-01-01 2007-12-31 
Iraq ISI/Jama’at Al-Tawhid wa Al-Jihad 2008-01-01 2010-12-31 
Iraq RJF/Al-Jaysh al-Islami fi Iraq 2005-01-01 2007-12-31 
Israel Fatah 2000-11-01 2007-12-31 
Israel PIJ 1995-01-01 1995-12-31 
Israel PIJ 2002-01-01 2010-12-31 
Israel Hamas 1993-09-12 1994-12-31 
Israel Hamas 2001-01-01 2009-12-31 
Israel PFLP 2001-01-01 2001-12-31 
Israel PFLP 1989-01-01 1989-12-31 
Israel AMB 2002-03-26 2004-12-31 
Israel PNA 1996-09-25 1996-12-31 
Israel PNA 2000-01-01 2002-12-31 
Israel Popular Resistance Committees 2006-01-01 2006-12-31 
Israel Hezbollah 1990-11-09 1999-12-31 
Israel Hezbollah 2006-01-01 2006-12-31 
Laos LRM 1989-12-01 1990-12-31 
Lebanon Lebanese Army (Aoun) 1989-03-15 1990-10-13 
Lebanon Lebanese Forces 1989-01-01 1989-09-23 
Lesotho Military Faction 1998-09-04 1998-09-24 
Liberia NPFL 1989-12-29 1990-09-10 
Liberia INPFL 1990-09-09 1990-09-10 
Liberia LURD 2000-07-08 2003-12-31 
Liberia MODEL 2003-01-01 2003-12-31 
Macedonia National Liberation Army (UCK) 2001-01-22 2001-08-12 
Mali MPA 1990-06-01 1990-12-31 
Mali FIAA 1994-01-01 1994-12-31 
Mali ATNMC 2007-01-01 2009-12-31 
Mauritania AQIM 2010-09-15 2010-12-31 
Mexico EZLN 1994-01-01 1994-01-12 
Mexico EPR 1996-06-28 1996-12-31 
Morocco POLISARIO 1975-01-20 1989-10-11 
Mozambique Renamo 1977-01-01 1992-10-04 
Myanmar KIO 1961-01-01 1992-12-01 
Myanmar KNU 1988-01-01 2010-12-31 
Myanmar Shan State Army - South (SSA-S) 1996-01-01 2010-12-31 
Myanmar MTA 1993-01-01 1995-12-31 
Myanmar NMSP 1990-01-01 1990-12-31 
Myanmar KNPP 1992-01-01 1992-12-31 
Myanmar KNPP 1996-01-01 1996-10-15 
Myanmar KNPP 2005-01-01 2005-12-31 
Myanmar Rohingya Solidarity Organisation 1991-12-29 1994-12-31 
Myanmar God's army 2000-01-01 2000-12-31 
Myanmar UWSA 1997-03-16 1997-12-31 
Myanmar ABSDF 1990-03-20 1994-12-31 
Myanmar Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front 1991-12-31 1992-12-31 
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Myanmar BMA 1996-12-23 1996-12-31 
Nepal CPN-M/UPF 1996-07-13 2006-12-31 
Nicaragua FDN/Contras 1982-03-18 1990-04-19 
Niger CRA 1994-05-16 1994-10-09 
Niger FDR 1995-07-10 1995-12-31 
Niger MNJ 2007-01-01 2008-12-31 
Niger FLAA 1991-12-01 1992-12-31 
Niger UFRA 1997-11-29 1997-11-29 
Nigeria Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa 2004-01-01 2004-12-31 
Nigeria NDPVF 2004-01-01 2004-12-31 
Nigeria Boko Haram 2009-07-26 2009-12-31 
Pakistan MQM 1990-01-01 1990-12-31 
Pakistan MQM 1995-01-01 1996-12-13 
Pakistan Baluch Ittehad 2005-01-01 2006-12-31 
Pakistan BLA/Baluchistan Liberation Army 2004-01-01 2009-12-31 
Pakistan TNSM 2007-07-04 2007-12-31 
Pakistan TTP 2008-01-01 2010-12-31 
Pakistan BRA/Baluchistan Republican Army 2008-01-01 2009-12-31 
Panama Military faction (forces of Moisés Giroldi) 1989-10-03 1989-10-03 
Papua New Guinea BRA 1989-01-01 1996-06-15 
Paraguay Military Faction (forces of General Rodriguez) 1989-02-03 1989-02-03 
Peru Sendero Luminoso 1982-08-22 1999-12-31 
Peru Sendero Luminoso 2007-11-14 2009-12-31 
Peru MRTA 1989-03-14 1993-12-31 
Philippines Communist Party of the Philippines 1969-09-01 2010-12-31 
Philippines Military Faction (forces of Honasan, Abenina & Zumel) 1987-01-27 1990-12-31 
Philippines MILF 1990-02-04 1990-12-31 
Philippines MILF 1994-01-01 2009-12-31 
Philippines MNLF 1981-01-01 1993-12-31 
Philippines Abu Sayyaf 1993-05-03 2010-12-31 
Philippines MNLF – NM 2001-11-19 2002-01-31 
Philippines MNLF – HM 2007-01-01 2007-12-31 
Romania National Salvation Front 1989-12-23 1989-12-25 
Russia Republic of Chechnya 1994-12-11 1996-08-31 
Russia Republic of Chechnya 1999-08-07 2007-12-31 
Russia Parliamentary forces 1993-10-03 1993-10-04 
Russia Wahhabi movement of the Buinaksk district 1999-08-10 1999-09-24 
Russia Forces of the Caucasus Emirate 2007-10-09 2010-12-31 
Rwanda FPR 1990-10-01 1994-07-19 
Rwanda FDLR 2009-01-20 2010-12-31 
Senegal MFDC 1990-09-01 2003-12-31 
Sierra Leone WSB 2000-01-01 2000-09-10 
Sierra Leone RUF 1991-03-23 1996-12-31 
Sierra Leone RUF 1997-01-01 2000-11-10 
Sierra Leone AFRC 1997-05-25 1999-12-31 
Sierra Leone Kamajors 1997-05-29 1998-12-31 
Somalia SNM 1983-02-05 1991-12-31 
Somalia SPM 1989-01-01 1991-12-31 
Somalia USC 1990-11-18 1991-01-29 
Somalia USC Faction 1991-01-29 1996-12-31 
Somalia SRRC 2001-05-12 2002-12-31 
Somalia ARS/UIC 2006-01-01 2008-12-31 
Somalia Al-Shabaab 2008-01-01 2010-12-31 
Somalia Harakat Ras Kamboni 2008-01-01 2008-12-31 
Somalia Hizbul-Islam 2009-03-17 2010-12-31 
Soviet Union Government of Armenia and ANM 1990-01-01 1991-08-15 
Soviet Union Azerbaijani Popular Front 1990-01-19 1990-01-20 
Spain ETA 1991-01-02 1992-10-25 
Sri Lanka LTTE 1984-09-10 1991-03-31 
Sri Lanka LTTE 1991-04-01 2009-05-19 
Sri Lanka JVP 1989-01-01 1990-12-31 
Sri Lanka EPRLF 1989-01-01 1989-12-31 
Sudan SLM/A 2003-01-01 2003-12-31 
Sudan SLM/A 2004-01-01 2010-12-31 
Sudan JEM 2003-01-01 2003-12-31 
Sudan JEM 2004-01-01 2010-12-31 
Sudan NRF 2006-01-01 2006-12-31 
Sudan SLM/A – MM 2006-01-01 2006-12-31 
Sudan SPLM 1983-05-17 2004-12-31 
Sudan SLM/A–Unity 2007-01-01 2008-12-31 
Tajikistan Movement for Peace in Tajikistan 1998-11-04 1998-11-09 
Tajikistan UTO 1992-06-29 1998-12-31 
Thailand Patani insurgents 2003-01-01 2010-12-31 
Trinidad and Tobago Jamaat al-Muslimeen 1990-07-27 1990-08-01 
Turkey Devrimci Sol 1991-07-13 1992-10-07 
Turkey PKK/Kadek 1984-08-15 2010-12-31 
Turkey MKP 2005-01-01 2005-12-31 
Uganda UPA 1989-01-01 1992-12-31 
Uganda LRA 1988-02-25 2001-08-08 
Uganda LRA 2001-08-09 2010-12-31 
Uganda WNBF 1996-05-01 1996-12-31 
Uganda ADF 1996-11-13 2002-12-31 
Uganda ADF 2007-01-01 2007-12-31 
Uganda UNRF II 1997-01-01 1997-12-31 
United Kingdom PIRA/IRA 1971-08-01 1991-12-15 
United Kingdom Real IRA 1998-08-15 1998-08-15 
Uzbekistan JIG 2004-01-01 2004-12-31 
Uzbekistan MIU 1999-02-16 2000-12-31 
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Venezuela Military faction (forces of Hugo Chávez) 1992-02-04 1992-11-29 
Yemen Democratic Republic of Yemen 1994-04-27 1994-07-07 
Yemen AQAP 2009-11-03 2010-12-31 
Yugoslavia Republic of Croatia 1991-06-26 1991-12-15 
Yugoslavia Croatian irregulars 1991-06-26 1991-12-15 
Yugoslavia Republic of Slovenia 1991-06-27 1991-07-15 
Yugoslavia UCK 1998-02-28 1999-06-03 
 
 
